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I.

INTRODUCTION

.

Let

us

imagine

a

.

tenant

.

.

.

living

in

. .

a

.

...

rented

.

apartment.

Unbeknownst to the tenant or the landlord, the circuit breaker in the
apartment is faulty. While the tenant plays with her small child in the
apartment one afternoon, the apartment catches fire.

Although the

tenant and her child are able to escape the burning apartment, both
suffer severe physical injury and emotional distress. According to the
residential landlord-tenant law of most American jurisdictions, our
landlord has breached a contractual obligation imposed by the lease
the implied warranty of habitability-by failing to maintain the
apartment circuitry in a safe condition.

And yet, because the harm

suffered takes the form of physical injury and emotional distress, this
breach appears to fit more squarely within the framework of tort law.
The classification of the tenant's cause of action as either contractual
or tort-based is essential: the rules governing the personal injury
claims of the tenant and her child may be vastly different depending
upon whether a court characterizes them as sounding in contract or in
tort. Contractual liability likely exposes our landlord to strict liability,
whereas liability in tort may be either strict or fault-based. Contractual
recovery may not include damages for pain and suffering or emotional
distress, whereas these damages would be awarded freely in tort. An
exculpation clause may insulate the landlord from contractual, but not
tort-based, liability.

The statute of limitations may differ widely

between the two causes of action. Moreover, a contractual theory of
recovery would likely extend only to the tenant due to the rule of
contractual privity, whereas a tort theory would extend equally to the
tenant and the tenant's child.
In cases such as this one, only a small minority of American

jurisdictions have employed a contract theory to hold a landlord liable
for personal injuries. The overwhelming majority of American courts
have found contract inapplicable to tenants' personal injury lawsuits
and instead apply a tort-based negligence analysis.

The American

majority approach to landlord liability is the result of decades of
debate that followed the "revolution" of residential landlord-tenant
law-the reconceptualization of the residential lease as a contract and
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the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability.1

Although a

contract model was initially chosen to implement this newfound
tenant-protection device, contract law strains to contain this state
imposed obligation relating not to economic expectations, but to
physical safety and emotional security. American jurisdictions have
dealt with the problem of contract law's awkward fit with legally
imposed duties by adopting a bifurcated approach to landlord liability.
Economic harm is compensated in contract; physical injury
compensated in tort. 2

is

As a result, depending on the type of harm

suffered, a tenant may have two very different claims against the
landlord based on the

same

wrongful act. Now that the dust has settled

following the landlord-tenant revolution, the time is ripe for assessing
whether this bifurcated approach is optimal, or whether an alternative
model would better address the needs of residential tenants, who
comprise nearly thirty percent of the American population.3
The relatively recent transformation of landlord-tenant law has
imported into the common law landlord-tenant relationship a number
of obligations that have been recognized in civil law leases for
centuries.4 Thus the common law's embrace of an implied warranty of
habitability closed a

long-existing

gulf between the two

legal

traditions' approaches to the obligations of residential landlords.

In

both traditions today, breach of the landlord's obligation to provide a
safe and habitable d welling gives rise to traditional contractual
remedies, including termination of the lease and damages.5 However,
the treatment of personal injuries, property damage, and nonpecuniary
losses continues to differ across jurisdictional lines. While American
tenants who suffer such losses are largely restricted to a tort theory of
recovery, civil law tenants have both contractual and tort theories at
their disposal.6 This Article turns to the civilian tradition to determine

I
See Samuel Bassett Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant
Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); Mary Ann Glendon, The
i n of American Landford-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1982);
Tra.ns!Onnato
Causes and
Edward H. Rabin, 7be Revolution in Residential Landford-Tenant Law:
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 521 (1984).
See infra Part IL
2.
.

3.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING

5.

See infia Parts II & III.
See infra Parts II & III.

SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES:

2007 (2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/h l 50-07.pdf
See infia Part III.
4.
6.
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whether this concurrent approach to landlord liability better allocates
the risk of harm between residential landlords and their tenants.7
The increasing convergence among the oft-polarized common
law and civil law traditions has been of late a subject of great interest.8
Comparative scholarship not only provides fodder for legal reform, but
also furthers understanding of differences, whether they result from
history, social policy, or sheer chance.9 And yet, comparative
examination of residential landlord-tenant law is relatively scarce. 10
7.
This Article focuses exclusively on residential, rather than commercial, leases.
Although American residential landlord-tenant law has undergone a dramatic transformation
through the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, in most jurisdictions commercial
landlords are still heavily insulated from responsibility for the condition of the premises. 5
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 44.07(a) (David A Thomas & N. Gregory Smith eds., 2d
ed. 2007).
Additionally, this Article deliberately utilizes the terms "landlord" and "tenant" rather
than "lessor" and "lessee" to refer to the parties to a residential lease. Although the latter
designations are perhaps more commonly employed in civil law parlance than the former, the
former are universally employed in the context of residential tenancy. Thus their use is
intended to stress the emphasis on the residential lessor/lessee relationship.
8.
See generally THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE:
FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF T HE 21 ST CENTURY (B.S. Markesinis ed.,
1994); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
52, 54 (1996); Ugo Mattei, Three Pattems ofLaw: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 8 (1997); Luke Nottage, Comment on Civil Law and
Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VICTORIA U. WELLING1DN
L. REv. 843 (200 I); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure ofComparative Law in the
Second Half of the Twentieth Centwy, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002); C.H. van Rhee,
Towards a Procedural !us Commune?, in REMEDIES IN ZUID-AFRIK.A EN EUROPA 217-32 (J.
Smits & G. Lubbe eds., 2003); Reinhard Zinunermann, 'Double Cross': Comparing Scots
and South African Law, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY
AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCO TLAND AND SOUT H AFRICA

2004).
See MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
9.
Above all, comparative law seeks to

1-2 (Reinhard Zimmermann et al. eds.,

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra

note 8, at v.

resolve the accidental and divisive differences in the laws of peoples at similar
stages of cultural and economic development, and reduce the number of
divergencies in law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social qualities of the
different nations but to historical accident or to temporar y or contingent
circumstances.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Tony Weir trans.,
3d ed. 1998).
10.
A few comparative works were undertaken during the initial phases of the United
States landlord-tenant "revolution." See, e.g., E.J. Cohn, Some Comparative Aspects of the
Law of Landlord and Tenant, 11 Moo. L. REv. 377 (1948); Michael Lipsky & Carl A.
Newnann, Landlord-Tenant Law in the United States and U'est Gennany-A Comparison of
Legal Approaches, 44 TuL. L. REv. 36, 66 (1969). Additionally, the European University
Institute recently completed a comprehensive comparative study of European tenancy laws
that is the first of its kind. See Tenancy Law and Procedure jn the EU, EUROPEAN UNIY. INST.,
http://www.eui.ewDepartmentsAndCentres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/ResearchThemes/
ProjectTenancyLaw.aspx (last updated Sept. 25, 2009); see also RICHARD FORD, A
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The paucity of comparative research in this area likely stems from the
fact that regulation of residential leases is inextricably intertwined with
housing policy, a matter generally thought of as local in character.11
Moreover, the fact that landlord-tenant relations, like many consumer
protection regimes, are governed by an amalgam of contract, property,
administrative, tort, and occasionally, constitutional law, makes them
particularly difficult to study even in the domestic context, much less
comparatively.
critical.

Nonetheless, comparative study of tenancy law is
2
Such analysis allows for the pooling of knowledge,1 and it

permits the study of more recent common law reforms against a
backdrop of legal systems that have applied similar concepts for many
years.13 To that end, this Article endeavors both to fill a gap in the
comparative literature and to provide a critical appraisal, through a
comparative lens, of the American approach to habitability in
residential lease.
A

close

examination

of the apparently

disparate regimes

governing the obligations of residential landlords reveals that the
action against the landlord who has breached the obligation to
maintain the premises, whether classified as contract- or tort-based, is
treated similarly in many respects across jurisdictional lines. Where
differences between the approaches exist, they stem primarily from the
rules governing the distinction between contract and tort. Moreover,
regardless of the theory of recovery employed, each system suffers
from unique anomalies and injustices. These difficulties are a direct
product of the system of classification and the interplay between
contract and tort. Comparative observation leads to the conclusion that
the landlord's liability for defective premises has been shaped more by
the arbitrary dividing line between contract and tort than by reasoned
policy making.

Thus this Article argues that landlord liability for

defective premises is

best

characterized as

"contort;' a hybrid

obligation whose contours reflect elements of both contract and tort.14
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF LEASE CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND THE CZECH

(1995); C hari Hugo & Philip Simpson, Lease, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
301 (1994); Marketa Selucka, Carissa Meyer & Johan Schweigl,
Tem1ination of a Lease Contract: General 'Wew from Czech and fllinois law, 12 TOURO
[NT'L L. REV. 64 (2009).
11.
See CHRISTOPH u. SCHMID GENERAL REPORT I http://www.eui.eu/Docurnents/
'
DepartrnentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching!ResearchT hemes/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Tenancy
LawProject/TenancyLawGeneralReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 20 I 0).
1 2.
See Cohn, supnrnote 10, at 400.
See Lipsky & Neumann, supra note I 0, at 37.
13.
14. The tenn "contort" was coined by Grant Gilmore in his The Death of Contract
lectures, in which he concluded "'contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort,'"

REPUBLIC

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

,
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so doing, this author seeks to anchor the landlord's obligation to
maintain the premises among other contorts, including, for example,
legal malpractice, medical malpractice, and products liability.15 These
and other examples illustrate that recasting an obligation as contort
emancipates it from the confines of classification and permits
lawmakers to choose the attributes that best suit social policy,
regardless of taxonomy. Landlord liability for defective premises
could benefit from similar liberation.
Part II of this Article traces the development of the American
approach to landlord liability for the condition of the premises, from
its historical roots through its twentieth-century revolution to its
modem application. In so doing, Part II highlights the reasons for the
American approach and its resulting anomalies. Part III examines the
approaches of several "mixed" jurisdictions whose landlord-tenant law
is grounded in the civilian tradition.16 This analysis demonstrates that
each of these jurisdictions has struggled with the nature of a landlord's
obligation for the condition of the premises, and explores the
difficulties each jurisdiction has encountered at the border between
contract and tort. Part IV revisits the timeless struggle to define
contract and tort as two distinct types of obligations, and reviews the
recognition of "contorts"--obligations that defy classification by their
very nature. Part IV concludes that landlord liability for defective
premises is best characterized as contort and argues that such recasting
is necessary to eliminate the conceptual difficulties and practical
injustices that to date have infected the regimes of not only some
civilian jurisdictions, but those of the United States.
In

and suggested that, as a result of this phenomenon, the first-year courses in Contracts and
Torts could be replaced with a single course entitled "Contorts." GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-98 (1974). Scholars have since used the term to describe obligations
consisting of a blend of elements deriving from both contract and tort. See, e.g, Saul
Litvinoff, Contract, Delict, Morals, and Law, 45 LOY. L. REv. 1 , 43 (1 999).
See inm Part Iv.A
15.
Although the term "mixed jurisdiction" has a number of connotations, this Article
1 6.
uses it in its narrow, technical sense to describe legal systems "at the intersection between
common law and civil law." Zimmermann, supra note 8, at 3. For a full discussion of the
reasons that mixed jurisdictions generally, and Scotland, South Africa, and Louisiana,
specifically, are explored in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 133- 1 38.
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II.

THE COMMON LAW REGIME

A.

HistoncalApproach:

Caveat Lessee and Tort Immunity

Historically, the common law regarded the residential lease as a
blend of contract and conveyance of real property.11

One result of

characterizing the lease as a convey ance was the adaptation of the
common law doctrine of

Jessee.18

caveat emptor to

the lease context as

Like a purchaser of real property, a tenant

was

caveat

expected to

inspect the premises prior to the inception of the lease, and

in the

absence of any express covenant to the contrary, the landlord owed no
obligation relating to the condition of the premises or their fitness for
use.19 The standard common law residential lease consisted merely of
two principal obligations:

the landlord's obligation to maintain the

tenant in peaceful possession of the premises (the covenant of "quiet
enjoyment") and the tenant's obligation to pay rent.2°
Of course, a tenant could negotiate for the landlord to assume a
covenant of repair, but such express contractual protections were rarely
available to residential tenants, who generally had little bargaining
power.21

Even where the landlord did covenant for the maintenance

and repair of the premises, breach of that obligation did not entitle the
tenant to dissolve the lease or withhold rent.22 Rather, an aggrieved
tenant's only right was an action for damages.23 Because a lease was
regarded

as

a type of convey ance, the covenants of the landlord and

tenant were construed as independent of one another.24
The property law paradigm had ramifications in the tort context
as well.25 The common law of occupier's liability generally imposed

17.

See Glendon,

supra note

l, at

505-09. Glendon notes that the contractual and

proprietary aspects of the residential lease were stressed to different degrees at different times
in history.

Id at 505-06. Thus the nature of the lease varied substantially between the

thirteenth century (when the lease was used primarily as a security device) and the fifteenth
century (by which time the lease

was

used more commonly for farming).

Id

See Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee,
Negligence, or StdctLiability?, 1975 Wrs. L. REv. 19, 27-28 (1975).
18.

19.
20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.

Id
Id at 32.
Id
Id at 31.
Id
Id at 32 . ln practice, the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment and the tenant's

obligation to pay rent were construed as mutually dependent by courts despite their technical
independence.

Id at 33. However, the same treatment was never applied to any other express
Id

or implied covenants of the landlord.
25.

Id at 48-49; Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of

Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 101 (1982).
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duties on landowners t o protect persons lawfully on the premises from
unreasonable risks of hann.26

The rationale for the imposition of

liability was that between the landowner and the person entering the
land, only the former had any meaningful ability to prevent such
harm.21 This rationale only holds, however, when the landowner is in
possession or control of the premises.28

In the context of lease, the

tenant acquires both possession and control of the premises, and the
landlord enjoys a mere reversionary interest.29

That transfer of

possession and control not only absolved the landlord from tort
responsibility to the tenant, it shifted the responsibility owed to third
persons from the landlord to the tenant as well. 30
Thus common law landlords enjoyed complete immunity from
liability, whether in contract or in tort. According to the doctrine of

caveat lessee, under which

the tenant assumed all risks associated with

defects in the premises, the landlord could not be held contractually
responsible for the premises' condition.11

Furthermore, the landlord

was not liable in tort to anyone, including the tenant or family and
guests, due to the lack of possession. 12 This was true even in the rare
case in which the landlord assumed a contractual obligation to
maintain the premises in good condition.13 As articulated by the King's
Bench in

1 905, "A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state, is

not liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents happening
during the term; for, fraud apart, there is no law against letting a
tumble-down house."34

26. Browder, supra. note 25, at 1 02-03. In fact, the common law imposed varying
degrees of care on occupiers of premises based upon whether the person entering the
premises, who was then injured, was properly classified as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.
Robert S. Driscoll, The Law ofPrenlises Liability in Amenca: Its Past, Present, and Some
Considerations for Its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 881, 883-84 (2006). This tripartite
classification system was abolished in England in 1 957 by the Occupiers' Liability Act, under
which a landowner owes a general duty of care to anyone lawfully on the premises. See id at
885; Occupiers' Liability Act, 1 957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 , § 2(1). In the United States, the
tripartite classification system has been abolished in many, but not all, jurisdictions. See
Driscoll, supra, at 888-91 .
27.
See w PAGE KEEroN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57
(5th ed. 1 984).
See 1d §§ 57, 63.
28.
29. 5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 41 .09(a).
Love, supra. note 18, at 48-49.
30.
31. Id
32.
Id
33. Cavalier v. Pope, [ 1905) 2 K.B. 757 (Eng.).
34. Id
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B

Modem Vanation: The Umted States

I.

From Caveat Lessee to Landlord Liability
The doctrine of caveat Jessee was received in the United States as

a part of the common law of England.35 At the tum of the twentieth
century, landlord-tenant law was so firmly entrenched in agrarian,
feudalistic principles that Justice Holmes was prompted to remark that
"the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacua:, it is a matter of
history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."36 In the near century since
this remark was made, United States landlord-tenant law has under
gone a "revolution" which has, in large part, detached the residential
lease from its historical moorings.37
Initially, allocation of responsibility for the condition of the
premises to tenants seemed both fair and sensible. The "no-duty" rule
was thought to reflect the implied intentions of the parties.38

Many

leases were agrarian in nature, and the agricultural leaseholder was
generally capable, in terms of both skill and financial means, to inspect
the premises at the outset of the lease and to make repairs
became necessary.39

as

they

However, as urban leases of dwellings became

more prevalent, courts in the United States began to view the rule of
caveat lessee as inappropriate when applied to residential leases.40 The

leased

premises,

which

once consisted

primarily of land

and

occasionally of simple improvements, were now complex, multiuni t
John S. Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U. L . REv. 189, 198-99 (1968). There were
35.
some exceptions. For example, even before the landlord-tenant "revolution," the law of
Georgia provided that the landlord in a lease with a ter m less than five years owed an implied
obligation of repair and maintenance of the premises in a condition reasonably fit for
habitation. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-l to -13 (2010) (original versions at GA. CODE OF
1863 §§ 2261, 2266); Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory WammtJcs of
Habitability in Residential Leases:

From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 54-56

Similarly, the 1848 Field Code, which imposed an obligation of repair on landlords,
substantially influenced the adoption of limited obligations of repair on landlords in
California, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id at 56-59.
36.
Gardiner v. William S . Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918) (in dictum).
37.
The transformation of U.S. landlord-tenant law and the broader implications of
this transformation has been fully treated elsewhere. For an excellent discussion of the
transition, see generally Glendon, supra note I. The implied warranty of habitability, upon
which this paper focuses, comprised only a part of this revolution. Other revolutionary
changes, all pro-tenant, included impositions of rent control and the development of
prohibitions on retaliatory eviction. See id
38.
James Charles Smith, Tenant Remedies for Breach of Habitability: Tort
Dimensions ofa Contract Concept, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 505, 509 (1987).
Love, sup.m note 18, at 28.
39.
40.
Id at 29-31; see, e.g., Young v. Povich, 116 A. 26, 27 (Me. 1922); Ingalls v.
Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286, 286-87 (Mass. 1892); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 136 N.Y.S. 140, 142 (Ap p .
(1979).

Term 1912).

422

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 85:413

structures.41 The tenants of these dwellings were generally poor,
unskilled laborers who had neither the funds nor the skills to make
inspections or repairs.42
Inroads into the doctrine of caveat Jessee were made slowly at
first. For example, first English courts, and then American courts,
recognized a limited implied warranty of habitability in short-term
leases of furnished apartments.43 Later, American courts held that an
implied covenant of fitness existed in all leases of premises to be used
for a specific purpose, so long as the premises were under construction
at the time the lease was negotiated.44 Soon after, an exception to
caveat lessee was imposed when the landlord failed to disclose a
dangerous defect in the premises of which the landlord knew and
which was not discoverable by the tenant.45 However, these exceptions
were narrow in their application and were not widely adopted.46 The
few judicial exceptions to caveat Jessee were ultimately viewed as
inadequate to protect urban residential tenants. Later, statutory housing
codes were enacted in an effort to establish and maintain minimum
standards for residential dwellings, but governmental enforcement was
ineffective at producing results, and statutes providing for private
causes of action were narrowly drawn.47
Meaningful change did not appear until the judicial imposition of
the implied warranty of habitability in all residential leases. Although
first recognized in the early 1930s, the implied warranty did not
become widespread until the 1970s.48 The seminal case adopting the
warranty is Javins v. First National Realty Corp., decided in 1970 by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.49 The court repudiated the doctrine of caveat Jessee as
Love, supra. note 18, at 28.
41.
42.
Id
43.
Id at 29-30.
44.
Id at 30-31.
45.
Id at 31.
46.
5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 4 l .04(a)(2Xi). For example, these exceptions only
covered defects that existed at the time of the inception of the lease, and not defects that arose
thereafter. T he utility of these exceptions was further hampered by the doctrine of
independent covenants. See Love, supra. note 18, at 31-33.
47.
See5 THOMPSON, supra.note 7, § 41.05(a)-(b).
48.
T he first case to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases was Delamaterv. Foreman, 239 N.W 148, 149(Minn. 1931).
49.
428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73(D.C. Cir.), cert demed, 400 U.S. 925(1970). It is worth
noting that that Judge J. Skelly W right, the author of the opinion, was a graduate of the
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, where he studied the Louisiana civil law.
Vernon V P almer, The Residential Lease in the Civil Law-A Considera.tion in Social
Context, 4 TUl.. Crv. L.F. 3, 6 (1988). In justifying the characterization of the lease as a

2010]

423

LANDLORD LIABILITY

outmoded in light of modem urban housing conditions, recognized an
implied warranty of habitability in all residential leases, and held that
this warranty and the tenant's duty to pay rent are correlative.so
As of this writing, all American jurisdictions except Arkansas
recognize

an

implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.s1

Some jurisdictions recognize the warranty jurisprudentially, while
others have enacted the warranty statutorily.52

Additionally, many

bilateral contract, Judge Wright cited to the Louisiana Civil Code and Marcel Planiol's
Treatise on the Civil Law, remarking: "The civil law has always viewed the lease as a
contract, and in our judgment that perspective has proved superior to that of the common
law." Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075 n.13.
50. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078-89.
51. See Ashley E. Norman, A Tenant's DJ1emma: The Arkansas Residential
Landlord-TenantActof2007, 62 ARK. L. REv. 859, 859 (2009).
52. Jurisdictions in which the highest courts have adopted the implied warranty of
habitability include California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana (implied in
fact only), Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Green v. Superior a.,
517 P.2d 1168, 1169-70 (Cal. 1974); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077; Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d
470, 472-75 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill. 1972); Johnson
v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 1999); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796
(Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (Kan. 1974); Boston Rous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 270
(Mo. 1984); O'Cain v . Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc. of Miss., 603 So. 2d 824, 833 (Miss.
1991); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526,
534 (N.J. 1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1979); Kamara.th v. Bennett, 568
S.W.2d 658, 660-61(Tex. 1978), superseded by statute, T EX. REV. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f
(West 1982) (current version at T EX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 2010)), as recognized
in Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App. 1990); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d
1006, 1010 (Utah 1991); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984); Foisy v. Wyman,
515 P2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 123(W. Va. 1978).
Jurisdictions with statutory warranties include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204
(2010); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (2010);AR!z. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 33-1324 (2010); CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1941 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN
§ 47a-7 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (2010); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 83.51 (West
2010); GA. CODE ANN.§ 44-7-13 (2010); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN § 521-42 (LexisNexis 2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (West 2010); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 562A.15 (West 2010); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 58-2553 (West 2010); KY. REv. STAT. ANN
§ 383.595 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2691 (2010); ME. REv. STAT. ANN tit.
14, § 6021 (2010); Mo. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127-127P, ch. 239, §§ 1-9 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAW S ANN
§ 554.139 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161(West 2010); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-823 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1419
(LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REv. S TAT. ANN . § 118A.280 (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN
§ 47-8-20 (West 2010); N.Y REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-42 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (2010); Omo REV. CODE ANN . § 5321.04
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states have adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
which contains both a general obligation of habitability as well as a
detailed list of additional maintenance responsibilities allocated to the
landlord. 53 Generally, a defect is considered actionable if it renders the
premises unsafe or unsanitary. 54 Thus the obligation of maintenance is
tied directly to the health and safety of the tenant. In all jurisdictions,

(LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN

.

§ 90.320 (West 2010);

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-22 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-

40-440 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-32-8 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 66-28-304 (2010);
Tux . PROP. CODE ANN .§ 92.052 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457 (2010); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.13 (2010); WASH.

REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (LexisNexis 2010);

W VA.

CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2010); WYO. STAT.
ANN.§ 1-21-1202 (2010).

53.

For a table of jurisdictions that have adopted the URLTA, see 7B UNIFORM LAWS

ANNOTATED 285 (2010). The following states have adopted the URLTA: Alabama, Alaska,

Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.

ALA. CODE §§ 35-9A-101 to -603; A LASKA STAT.

§§ 34.03.010-.380; Aruz . REV. STAT. ANN . §§ 33-1301 to -1381; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 47a-l to -20a; FLA . STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.67; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 521-1 to -78; IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 562A.l -.37; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 383.500-.715; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.601-.616; MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 89-8-1 to -

27; M ONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1401 to -1449;
N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 47-8-1 to -52; OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101-136; OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90.100-.940; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-1 to -57; S.C. CoDE ANN . §§ 27-40-10 to -940;
TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 66-28-101 to -521; VA . CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to .40; WASH. REv.

CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010-430, .900.

Section 2.104(a) of the Uniform Residential Landlord

Tenant Act provides:
A landlord shall
(1)

comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes

(2)

make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises

(3)

in a fit and habitable condition;
keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;

materially affecting health and safety;

(4)

maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities
and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by

(5)

him;
provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the
removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the
occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and

(6)

supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and
reasonable heat [between [October I] and [May I]] except where the
building that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped
for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water
is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and
supplied by a direct public utility connection.

54.
See, e.g., Detling, 671 S.W2d at 270; see also Myron Moskowitz, The Implied
War:ranryr ofHabitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 C ALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1459
( 1974).
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waiver of the warranty of habitability is either entirely foreclosed or
very limited, in recognition of both the importance of the social policy
underpinning the warranty and the residential tenant's relative lack of
bargaining power. 55

2.

The Tort Aspects of the Warranty of Habitability

As they were adopted, both statutory and judicial warranties
recognized a variety of contractual remedies, including dissolution of
the lease, reformation of the lease, repair-and-deduct rights, rent
withholding, and awards for compensatory damages.56 However, it
was not immediately apparent whether consequential losses for
personal injury and property damage arising from breach of the
warranty of habitability would be available to tenants, and, if so,
whether such recovery would be predicated on breach of contract or
tort.
By the time the warranty of habitability arrived in the main
stream, the rule of complete landlord immunity from responsibility in
tort had begun to falter slightly.57 But once the implied warranty of
habitability was recognized in all residential leases, courts gradually
began to favor a broad tort model of recovery for tenants and third
parties. As early as 1973, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
announced that by adopting the implied warranty of habitability
several years earlier, it had "discarded the very legal foundation and
justification for the landlord's immunity in tort for injuries to the tenant
or third persons" and abandoned the rule oflandlord immunity in favor
55.
5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 4 1 .06(a)(5). For example, the Restatement (Second)
of Property § 5.6 states that the parties "may agree to increase or decrease what would
otherwise be the obligations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the leased
property" as long as the agreement is not "unconscionable or significantly against public
policy." Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5 . 6
( 1977)).
56.
Id § 43.05(a).
5 7.
Several exceptions to the rule emerged from the jurisprudence. For example,
landlords were held liable for preexisting defects known to the landlord, but not the tenant.
Love, supra note 1 8, at 50-5 1 . Also, injuries caused by defects in premises leased for
admission to the public were compensable in tort. Id at 53-54. Injuries caused by defects in
common areas, over which the landlord was said to retain control, were also found to be
compensable. See 1d Landlords were held responsible for injuries resulting from the failure
to effect expressly covenant repairs as well as for injuries caused by the negligent making of
repairs. See id at 57-65 . Tort liability was also occasionally premised on violations of
housing codes setting forth statutory repair obligations. See id at 68-78. Finally, a minority
of jurisdictions held that a landlord in breach of the implied warranty of habitability in
furnished dwellings was also liable in tort. Id. at 54-57. The standard of liability imposed
under these theories ranged from negligence to strict liability. See generallyid at 48-78.
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of a general negligence theory.58 Another approach to tort liability was
adopted in

1 977 by the Restatement of Property, which provides that

landlords may be liable for personal injury and property damage
caused by the landlord's failure to exercise reasonable care to repair a
defect in violation of the implied warranty of habitability or o ther
statutory

or

administrative duty.59

A few isolated decisions went so far as to hold residential
landlords strictly liable in tort for defects in the premises.60 For
example, in 1985, the California Supreme Court held in Becker v. !RM
that a landlord was strictly liable for injuries suffered by a tenant
1
who slipped and fell against an untempered glass shower door. 6 T he

Corp.

court justified its imposition of strict liability o n the ground that
mo dern urban tenants are neither in the position to inspect residential
premises for latent defects nor to bear the costs of repairs.62 T he court
also drew

an

analogy to the context of the sale of go ods, where well

settled products liability principles hold manufacturers strictly liable in
tort for personal injuries arising from latent defects.63

T he court

remarked, ''The landlord who markets the product bears the costs of
injuries resulting from the defects."64

Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973).
58.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 17.6 ( 1977).
59.
The Restatement provides:
A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others
upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a
dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession,
if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence
of the condition is in violation of:
an implied warranty o f habitability; or
(I)
a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.
(2)

Id The term "physical harm" contained in section 1 7.6 has been interpreted to include harm
to land and chattels as well as harm to the person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7.3
(1965); Miller v. Christian, 958 F.2d 1 234, 1240 (3d Cir. 1 992). States adopting the
Restatement approach include Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington.
Thompson v. Crownover, 381 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. 1 989); Richwind Joint Venture 4 v.
Brunson, 645 A.2d 1 147, 1 1 52 (Md. 1 994), oveJTu!ed on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin
Realty ill, Inc., 835 A.2d 6 1 6, 622 (Md. 2003); Scott v. Garfield, 9 1 2 N.E.2d 1 000, 1 006
(Mass. 2009); Morris v. Kaylor Eng'g Co., 565 S.W2d 334, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 978); Lian
v. Stalick, 25 P3d 467, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
60.
See, e.g., Kaplan v. Coulston, 381 N.YS.2d 634, 638 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1 976); see
also Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 774, 777-78 (Ohio 1 9 8 1 ) (holding violation
of statutory warranty of habitability constitutes negligence per se).
61.
698 P.2d 1 1 6, 1 1 7 (Cal. 1985).
62.
Id at 122-23.
63.
Id at 1 1 8.
64.
Id at 123.
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The Becker decision generated a great deal of controversy and
academic debate regarding the suitability of the analogy between
residential leases and sales of goods, and more broadly, the propriety
of subjecting landlords to strict liability.65 Ten years after

Becker, the

California Supreme Court reevaluated its ruling and ultimately
overruled it, holding that "we erred in Becker in applying the doctrine
of strict products liability to a residential landlord that is not a part of
the manufacturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective
product that caused the injury."66

The few decisions in other

jurisdictions finding landlords strictly liable were not followed; rather,
several courts specifically considered and rejected the application of
strict liability to residential landlords.67
A number ofjurisdictions have wrestled with the issue of whether
to permit tenants to recover on a breach of contract theory. A minority
of courts have held that a tenant may recover damages for personal
injuries or property damage on the contract.68

These tribunals

considered consequential damages for personal injury and property
damage to be fairly within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of contracting.69

However, these decisions have largely either been

overruled or not followed.
65. See, e.g., Emily M. H alid ay, Comment, Ca/iforma 's Approach to Landlord
L1ab1Jity for Tenant lnjunes: Strict Liability Reexamined, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 367 ( 1 993);

Joan L. Neisser, The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict Liability Principles to Landlords,
64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527 (1 990); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Stnd Tort LiabiJity of
Landlords: Bec ker v. IRM C orp. in Contex� 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1986).
66. Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P2d 905, 906 (Cal. 1 995).
67. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Sky line Apartments, Inc., 301 A.2d 463, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.), aff'dper curiam, 3 1 1 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1973); Segal v. Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop.,
Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465-66 (Civ. Ct. 1980), affif per curiam, 442 N.YS.2d 686 (App.
Tenn. 1 98 1 ); Pezzolanella v. Galloway, 503 N.Y.S.2 d 990, 992 (Utica Cit y Ct. 1986).
68. See, e.g., Lovic k v. Nigro, No. LPLCV9405424735, 1997 WL 1 12806, at *5-6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 1 997); B oudreau v. Gen. E lec. C o., 625 P2d 384, 390 (H aw. Ct.
App. 198 1); Simon v. Solomon, 43 1 N.E.2 d 556, 570 (Mass. 1982); Trentacost v. Brussel,
4 1 2 A.2d 436, 443 (N.J. 1980); see also Estate of Vazquez v. Hepner, 564 N.W2 d 426, 430
(Iowa 1 997) (holding, in a case involving the death of tenant, that an aggrieved tenant m a y
recover incidental and consequential damages, but finding n o vio lation of the warranty);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W2d 79 1 , 797 (Iowa 1972) ("In all events, tenant should have the
inci dental and consequential damages which fall within the general principles governing the
allowance of such damages.").
69. See Old Town Dev. C o. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2 d 744, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1 976)
("[T] here appears to be a growing rec ogni tion that a residential landlord may be held liable
for breach of the implied warran t y of habitabilit y contained in the lease (a contract) resulting
in personal injury or personal property damage to the tenant. The consequential damages
envisioned by Hadley v. Baxendale logically come to fruition in breac h of an implied
warrant y of habitabilit y."), superseded as moo� 369 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. 1977); see also
Boudreau, 625 P.2d at 390 ( arguing that "the implied warrant y of habitability does not extend
to personal injuries seems to us to be logically meritless").
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The majority of courts to consider the issue have determined that
a claim on the contract is not the proper vehicle for recovery of
personal injury or property damages. A 1 991 decision of the Vermont
Supreme Court, Favreau v. Miller, squarely addressed this issue. 10 The
court stated that where personal injury is concerned, tort principles
provide a "more straightforward way" to delineate the rights and duties
of the parties.11 The court was particularly concerned with issues of
causation, fault, and comparative negligence, all of which, it opined, a
tort model is better equipped to handle.72 Still other courts have based
their refusal to award personal injury and property damages on a
contract theory on the notion that the landlord should not be cast in
strict liability as an "insurer" of the tenant.73 The preference for
adjudication of the landlord's fault is thus one compelling basis for
refusing to award personal injury or property damages on a contract
theory.74
Beyond fault, additional grounds have been articulated for refusal
to award personal injury damages for breach of the warranty of
habitability. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in 2003
that to permit the recovery of personal injury damages on an implied
warranty of habitability theory "would eliminate the fundamental
distinctions between contract and tort and only lead to further
confusion regarding the nature and role of these two theories of
recovery."75 Other j urisdictions have refused to award damages for
personal injury or property damage on the ground that such
consequential damages are not within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of contracting.76 Another contingent of courts have applied
70.

591 A.2d 68 (Vt. 1 99 1 ).

71.

Id at 73;

see also Schuman v. Kobets, 760 N.E.2d 682, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)

("We agree that these are questions better left to be resolved by the rules developed under tort
and negligence law.").
72.

Favreau, 591 A.2d at 73.

73.

See, e.g. , Proffer v. Randall, 755 S .W2d 655, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 988); Loven v.

Davis, 783 S.W2d 152, 1 55-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 990).

("An

74.

See, e.g., Antwaun v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W2d 456, 469 (Wis. 1 999)

injured parties' [sic] claim for personal injuries is a tort claim in negligence . . . . It is

not the breach of warranty . . . that gives rise to the cause of action for the personal injury.
Instead, it is the negligent act or omission.").
75.

See Howard ex rel Mcintyre v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 8 1 6 A.2d 1204, 1 2 1 2 (Pa.

Comrnw. Ct. 2003); see also Beese v. Nat'! Bank of Albany Park, 403 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1 9 80) (refusing damages for personal injury due to the "economic and social
consequences" involved).
76.

See, e.g, Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 7 1 7 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. 1 999). Indiana

has not recognized a warranty of habitability implied by law in every residential lease; rather,

an implied warranty of habitability exists only when implied in fact in a particular agreement.
See id at 32. On the issue of personal injury damages,

the court held:

''Where the warranty
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a more extreme approach, refusing to award consequential damages of
any kind . 77
Massachusetts courts have most thoroughly vetted the problem of
contractual recovery for personal injury and property damages. In its

1 979 decision in Crowell

v.

McCaf!Tey, the Massachusetts Supreme

Court recognized the availability of recovery for personal injury
damages resulting from breach of the warranty of habitability.78 In the
ensuing years, a number of tenants relied on

Crowell to assert claims

against their landlords for personal injury or property damage
sounding not in tort, but in breach of contract. 79 Even still, following

Crowell, the scope and nature of claims for personal injuries resulting
from landlords' breach of the implied warranty of habitability
remained unsettled.

First,

Crowell declined to address whether the

standard of liability in a breach of warranty claim was strict liability or
negligence.80 Later appellate decisions and commentary appeared to
favor a showing by the injured party that the landlord was negligent in
failing to remedy

a

defect of which he had notice, but no court ever

made such a ruling. 81

Second, as

Crowell involved an injured tenant,

the question of whether a lawful visitor who was not a signatory to the
lease could invoke the implied warranty of habitability to recover for
is express, consequential damages for injury to the person may be available as a remedy.
Where the warranty is implied-in-fact, however, consequential damages may not be awarded
because personal injury is outside the parties' contemplation." Id
77.
See, e.g. , Chiu v. City o f Portland, 788 A.2d 1 83 , 1 88 n.6 (Me. 2002); Auburn v.
Amoco Oil Co., 435 N.E.2d 780, 782-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 982).
78.

386 N.E.2d 1 256, 126 1 (Mass. 1979). The court justified the extension of the

implied warranty of habitability to personal injury claims with reference to jurisprudence
pennitting tenants to recover for personal injuries resulting from the previously recognized
but more limited implied warranty of habitability in short-term rentals of furnished dwellings.
ld The court remarked that "extension of the warranty [of habitability] to the ordinary
residential tenancy . . . logically carries with it liability for personal injuries caused by a
breach." Id
79.
See, e.g., Farris v. Univ. of Mass., No. 04-P-467, 2005 WL 2869 16, at * l (Mass.
App. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (discussing plaintiff's assertion that
breach of implied warranty of habitability sounded in contract rather than tort and therefore
Massachusetts Tort Claim Act was inapplicable); Ruiz v. Pelson Realty Trust, No. CIV A. 991 969, 2001 WL 8 1 0347, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 200 1 ) ("[W]hen a tenant suffers
personal injury as a result of a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the
landlord's contractual obligation to the tenant requires the payment of compensatory damages
to the tenant under a strict liability standard.").
Crowell, 386 N.E.2d at 1 261-62.
80.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Littleton, 859 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). The
81.
Massachusetts Academy ofTrial Attorneys filed an amicus brief arguing vociferously in favor
of a strict liability standard, which would subject the landlord to liability in the absence of a

violation of a statutory housing code. Id at 885-86 & n.7. The court declined to adopt such a

standard. Id; see also Jeffrey C. Melick, 'The Standard ofCare in Wammty ofHabitability
Cases, 82 MAss. L. REv. 1 8 7, 1 93 ( 1 997).
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personal injuries remained.82 Following Crowell, several courts
extended the warranty to third party claimants, but others declined to
do so.83 As noted by a leading Massachusetts authority on the warranty
of habitability, those decisions refusing to extend the warranty of
habitability to guests and visitors did so by emphasizing the contrac
tual nature of the claim. 84
In its 2009 decision in Scott v. GadJeld, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court clarified that the "implied warranty of habitability . . .
is a multi-faceted legal concept that encompasses contract and tort
principles, as well as the State building and sanitary codes."85
According to the court, the contractual nature of the implied warranty
permits tenants to recover for economic losses resulting from the
landlord's breach.86 The tort-like nature of the warranty, on the other
hand, permits both tenants andthird parties lawfully on the premises to
recover damages for personal injuries. 87 The court went on to explain
that the conclusion that lawful visitors may recover for injuries
resulting from the landlord's breach of warranty is predicated on
the expectation that a tenant might invite

a guest into his home, and the
a guest

concomitant expectation that the tenant's home must be safe for

to visit-which together go to the very heart of the landlord's
contractual obligation to deliver and maintain habitable premises that
comply with the building and sanitary codes.

88

Thus, even in authorizing extension of the warranty to protect third
parties, the court emphasized the contractual aspect of the expectations
of the parties. Moreover, the court in Scottexplained that although the
principles of comparative fault are applicable to general negligence
Crowell, 386 N.E.2d at 1259.
82.
See Gifford v. Sears, No. 04 1 65A, 2005 WL 2373847, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
83.
Aug. 12, 2005); Ruiz, 2001 WL 8 1 0347, at *4; Mitchell-Gionet v. Markowski, No. 930903,
1994 WL 878955, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994); cf. Sullivan v. H.H. Gilbert Mgmt.
Corp., No. 93-48 18, 1 997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 1 3 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 16, 1 997);
Egenlauf v. Brown, No. CA 94 1 040, 1 996 WL 1 1 86833, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 5,
1996).
84.
See Jeffrey C. Melick, Actions Based on the Wammty of Habita bility, in
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETIS § 7.2.2
(2009).
912 N.E.2d 1 000, 1 005 (Mass. 2009).
85.
86.
Id
87.
Id Here, the court appeared to draw an analogy between the warranty of
habitability in lease and the implied warranty of merchantability in sales of goods. See 1d at
1006; Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1 040-41 (Mass. 1 983)
(recognizing product liability claims for personal injuries based on breach of warranty sound
essentially in tort).
88.
Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1 005.
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claims, they are inapplicable to breach of implied warranty claims
under Massachusetts statutory laW.89

At present, Massachusetts is

alone in its recognition of a hybrid contract-tort theory of recovery for
personal injuries. In other jurisdictions, it is clear that consequential
losses of this type are not compensable in contract.

3.

Critique of the American Approach
A number of anomalies result from the bifurcation of personal

injury and property damage claims from claims for economic harm.
First, most American courts permit aggrieved tenants suing in contract
to recover economic damages only.

The measure of damages is

generally taken as the "difference between the fair rental value of the
premises if they had been as warranted and as they were during the
occupation in the unsafe and unsanitary conditions."90 This has been
"criticized on the ground that a tenant rents a dwelling for shelter, not
profit, and that tenant's losses, in discomfort and worry over dangers,
are intangible."91

However, very few courts have recognized the

possibility of recovery for emotional distress suffered by a tenant.92
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to entirely foreclose the
possibility of recovery of any consequential losses in contract,
relegating claims for consequential damages relating to personal
injury, property damage, and emotional distress entirely to tort.93
Such a restriction is artificial and inconsistent with other
comparable areas of law. First, the view that consequential losses are
not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting is
not credible, given that the warranty of habitability is inextricably tied
89.
Id at 1 005-06 &
Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1 03 3 .

n.7 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN . ch. 23 1 , § 85 (West 2000));
The court's holding on the issue of comparative fault is curious.

The court's conclusion that comparative negligence does not apply to the breach of implied
warranty of habitability is based upon its previous holdings in the products liability context
that Massachusetts ' comparative fault regime does not apply to claims involving the implied
warranty of merchantability.

See Scott,

9 1 2 N.E.2d at 1 005-06 & n.7 (citing Correia, 446

N.E.2d at 1033). In the seminal case on that issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held
that

the

negligence

comparative

scheme

is

inappl icable

to

implied

warranty

of

merchantability claims because the standard of care is strict liability, and not negligence.

Correia, 446 N.E.2d at

1 03 9-40. However, in

Scott, the court specifically declinedto address

whether the landlord's standard of care in an implied warranty of habitability case involving
personal injuries is one of strict l iability or negl igence.
90.
91.
92.

MILTON R.

See Scott, 9 1 2 N.E.2d at 1 006 n.8.
FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 1 0. 1 0 1 (4th ed. 1 997).

Id
See Simon v. Solomon, 43 1

N.E.2d 556, 561 -62 (Mass. 1982); Fair v. Negley, 390

A.2d 240, 246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1 978); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (Vt. 1984).
93.

See, e.g., 303

Beverly Group, L.L.C. v. Alster, 735 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (N.Y. App.

Term 200 1 ); Chiu v. City of Portland, 788 A.2d 183, 1 88 n.6 (Me. 2002).
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Moreover, since

1 952,

85:413

consequential

awards for injury to both person and property have been explicitly
recoverable under the Uniform Commercial Code for a seller's breach
of the contractual
goods.94

warranty

of merchantability implicit in sales of

Perhaps more pertinent, given the body of jurisprudence

distinguishing the lease of a dwelling from the sale of a product,95 the
Uniform Commercial

Code similarly provides

for consequential

damages resulting from injury to person or property in the context of
leases of goods.96 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
explicitly provides for the availability of nonpecuniary damages in
contract claims involving bodily harm.91

The strongest reason for

relegating claims for consequential losses to tort is the policy-based
preference against imposing strict liability on landlords. And yet, even
this rationale is flawed.

Although the traditional American view of

contractual liability is liability without fault,98 fault is not entirely
foreign to American contract law. 99
Moreover, the complete removal of claims for consequential
losses from the realm of contract has unintended consequences.
Although an injured plaintiff is permitted to cumulate actions in
contract and in tort under American law, such cumulation of claims
does not necessarily provide the tenant with full relief

One prob

lematic area concerns a tenant's protection from so called "retaliatory
eviction" by landlords, or eviction of a tenant in retribution for the
The U.C.C. abandons the requirement of
U.C.C. § 2-7 1 5(2)(b) (2002).
94.
"foreseeability" in this context in favor of a requirement that the consequential losses for
injury to person or property be "proximately" caused by the seller's breach. 2 WILLIAM D.
HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2:7 1 5:6 (201 0).
95.
See infra notes 6 1 -67 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 2A-520(2)(b) (2003). As in the sales context, the U.C.C. adopts a
96.
"proximate cause" requirement rather than a "foreseeability" requirement for damages
relating to injury to person or property. HAWKLAND, supra note 94, § 2A:520:6.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 ( 1 982) ("Recovery for emotional
97.
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.").
This rule has been adopted in most U.S. jurisdictions. See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:7 & n.2 1 (4th ed. 2002). Note, however, that the
original Restatement's formulation of the rule required not only bodily injury but also
''wanton or reckless breach." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 34 1 ( 1982).
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword· Fault in Amen'can Contract Law,
98.
107 MICH. L. REV. 134 1 , 1 34 1 (2009); Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the
Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TuL. L. REV. 457, 463 ( 1 994); Roy Kreitner, Fault
at the Contract-Tort Interface, 1 07 MICH. L . REv. 1 533, 1 535 (2009); Eric A. Posner, Fault in
Contract Law, 1 07 MICH. L. REV. 1 43 1 , 1436 (2009).
See Posner, supra note 98, at 1431 ("[A)lthough Anglo-American contract law is
99.
usually called a strict-liability system, it does contain pockets of fault."). See also infra Part
rvc.2.
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bringing of an implied warranty of habitability claim.100 Many states
prohibit such retaliatory eviction either jurisprudentially or by
statute.101 However, because retaliatory eviction remedies may be
available only when the aggrieved tenant has brought a contract-based

warranty claim, and not in connection with a tort-based claim, tenants
who are physically injured or suffer property damage as a result of a
defect in the premises are anomalously less protected than those who
suffer mere inconvenience and out-of-pocket expenses associated with
reparrs.
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently addressed this issue in its

2009 decision in Helfrich

v.

Valdez Motor

Corp. '°2 Following an on

premises slip and fall that resulted in several days of hospitalization,
Helfrich, a residential tenant, retained an attorney. 103

The attorney

issued a demand letter, in response to which the landlord took steps to
evict Helfrich.104

Helfrich sued, alleging negligence and violation of

the URLTA's antiretaliation provisions.105 The court rejected Helfrich's
retaliatory eviction claim on the ground that the statutory protections
16
extend only to tenants alleging harm governed by the URLTA. 0
According to the court, although defective premises may fall within
the ambit of the URLTA's obligation to maintain the premises, the
damages claimed by Helfrich were beyond the scope of the statutory
regime, which deals only with contractual claims. 107 After reluctantly
holding that a retaliatory eviction claim was unavailable to a plaintiff
suing in tort for personal injury, the court reflected that "[a]s a matter
of policy, those tenants are no less worthy of protection from
retaliation."108 A dissenting Justice decried the result

as

producing a

"perverse framework of anti-retaliation protection."109 As observed by
1 00. Many states provide such protection via statute. 5 THOMPSON, supra note 7,
§ 43 .06(a); see, e.g., CAL. C!V. CODE § 1 942.5 (West 20 1 0); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.64 (West
20 I 0); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8590(2) (McKinney 201 0). The URLTA includes a retaliatory
conduct provision, § 5 . 1 0 1 .
J O I . 5 THOMPSON, supra note 7 , § 4 1 .08(a) & nn.483-84.
I 02. 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).
1 03 . Id at 555.
1 04 . Id
1 05. Id
1 06. Id at 558-59.
1 07. Id at 559.
I 08. Id at 560.
Several other states have adopted the
I 09. Id at 564 (Winfree, J., dissenting).
URLTA's anti-retaliation provision, including New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-514 (2010); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 59.1 8.240 (West 2 0 1 0). However, not all states' anti-retaliatory eviction
schemes foreclose tort claimants from invoking protection.

For example, Oregon's statute
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the court, this unjust result is not limited to the URLTA; New York's
antiretaliation statute, which is not based on the uniform act, likewise
limits the scope of protection to those tenants exercising contract
based rights emanating from landlord-tenant legislation.1 1 0
THE CIVIL LAW REGIME

III.

Now that the historical evolution of the American approach and
its theoretical underpinnings have been fully explored, foreign systems
will be examined to consider how the problem of landlord liability for
defective premises is dealt with abroad. To this end, the functionalist
method of comparative law shall be employed.

The functionalist

method is primarily concerned with determining whether different
legal systems are confronted with a similar legal problem, whether
those systems have the same or different legal rules to address that
1

problem, and whether those rules lead to similar or differing results. 11

The aim is to look past terminology, or, in this case, taxonomy, to
determine whether jurisdictions use common approaches to address
common problems.1 1 2 Part III of this Article thus turns to the civil law
tradition for a study in contrast and similarity.
The HistodcalApproach: Concurrent Liability in Contract and

A.

Tort
The civil law approach to the lease is profoundly different from
the historical approach of the common law. Whereas the common law
viewed the residential lease primarily as a conveyance, akin to a sale,
the civil law has long characterized the lease as a contract that transfers
to the tenant a personal right of use and enj oyment rather than any
form of "title," as understood in the common law. 1 13 The fundamental
prohibits retaliation against any tenant who "has performed or expressed intent to perform
any other act for the purpose of asserting, protecting or invoking the protection of any right
secured to tenants under any federal, state or local law." OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
20 1 0) .
1 1 0.

Helfrich, 207 P 3 d at 560 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW

§ 90.385 (West

§§ 223-b, 235-b

(McKinney 20 1 O)); see also Pezzolanella v. Galloway, 503 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Utica City Ct.
1 986).
1 1 1.
( 1 998).
1 1 2.

See John

C. Reitz,

How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J.

COMP.

L. 6 1 7, 622

See id at 622-24.

See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3 . 1 1 (A. James Casner ed., 1 952) ("(T]he
lease is primarily a conveyance, executed as to the lessor at the time the lease is made, to

1 1 3.

which the covenants are merely incidental."); James Gordley, The Common Law in the
Twentieth Century:

Some Unfinished Business, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1 8 1 5 , 1 867 (2000)

("While the common law leasehold roughly corresponds to the civil law lease, there is a
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nature of the civil law lease and the principal elements of its governing
scheme date back to Roman law.114 The Roman law lease was regarded
as a bilateral contract that transferred to the tenant the mere use and
enjoyment of the leased premises, not an ownership interest.115
Modern civil law systems continue to recognize the lease as a contract,
bilateral in nature, and thus replete with a number of continuing,
mutually dependent duties on the part of both the parties.116
At Roman law, one such implied obligation was the obligation of
repair.

The landlord was required to turn the property over to the

tenant in a state of good repair, and to maintain the premises in good
condition throughout the term of the lease.117 If the property

was

not

fit for the use intended by the parties, the tenant could demand that the
lease be dissolved. 118 The landlord was also liable for damages if the
tenant suffered harm from an undisclosed defect of which the landlord
knew or should have known. 1 19 The current civilian approach to the
fundamental difference. In common law, the lease was conceived not as an on-going contract,
as it is in civil law, but as the conveyance of an interest in land."); Gerald G. Greenfield &
Michael Z. Margolies, An Implied Wammty ofFitness in Nonresidential Leases, 45 ALB. L.
REv. 855, 866 (198 1 ) ("The crucial difference is that the common law views the lessor's

obligations as substantially completed on the

first

day of the lease, whereas the civil law

views the lease as a continuing bilateral contract whereby each day the lessor must hold out
the property for the tenant.").
1 14.

For a detailed, contemporary discussion of the Roman law of lease, see W.W.

BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO

JUSTINJAN 498-503 (2d

ed.

1 9 50).
I 15.

id at 498-99.

1 1 6.

Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 1 1 3, at 866. In many modem day civil law
See Hugo &

jurisdictions, the tenant acquires a type of real right in the leased premises.

Simpson, supra note 1 0, at 302. However, the recognition of this real right does not affect the
fundamentally contractual nature o f the lease.
1 17.

BUCKLAND, supra note 1 1 4, at 500.

1 1 8.

Calm, supra note I 0, at 380.

I 1 9.

BUCKLAND, supra note 1 1 4, at 500. In fact, the question of whether, at

Roman

Jaw, the landlord was liable for consequential damages only when the landlord failed to
disclose a defect of which the landlord knew or should have known, or whether the landlord
was liable in the absence of fault, is disputed. Buckland writes that
(t]he lessor also was liable for culpa levis in relation to the thing, and must
compensate for damage due to defects, not disclosed, of which he knew or ought to
have known. If the thing was in such a state that it did not serve for the ordinary
uses of such things, he was responsible, not on the ground of negligence, but for
not supplying what he contracted to supply.
Id at 500. A number of scholars have interpreted the Roman law as requiring a showing of

fault by the tenant. See HUGO

GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND § 3 . 1 4 . 1 2 (R.W.
(G.A. Mulligan trans., 1953).

Lee trans., 1 936); PITTHIER, CONTRAT DE LOUAGE § 1 1 9

Modem South African scholars chal lenge the validity of these conclusions. See, e.g., W.E.
COOPER, LANDLORD AND TENANT 1 08-09 (2d ed. 1994). The resolution of the question of the

proper interpretation of the Roman law is beyond the purview of this Article, particularly
given the position of this Author that regardless of what standard of liability may have been
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landlord's responsibility for the condition of the premises has changed
strikingly little since its Roman formulations.

Many contemporary

civilian systems retain the rule that the landlord is required to let the
property in a condition fit for its intended use and to maintain the
premises in good repair. 120
The basis for the landlord's responsibility for the condition of the
premises is directly tied to the fact that the civilian lease is not a
conveyance. 121 The civil law has historically recognized the rule of res
pent domino, according to which the risk of loss or damage to a thing
is borne by its owner.122

Because the lease entails no transfer of

ownership, it likewise entails no transfer to the tenant of responsibility

for damage or deterioration. 1 23 Thus the landlord remains responsible
for all repairs and items of damage to the leased thing, except for those
4
resulting from the fault of the tenant. 12
The civil law approach to premises liability in tort likewise has
roots in the Roman law.

According to the Jex Aqwlia

de damno, a

statutory enactment of the third century B.C., the owner of certain
types of damaged property had a right to compensation from the
wrongdoer. 125 The Aquilian action was eventually expanded to include
. 6
In the
all negligent property damage and personal injury 12
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Natural Law scholars used
this seed from the Roman law to bring forth the so-called general
principle of tort responsibility, that everyone is responsible for the
harm caused by his or her fault.121 This principle lies at the foundation
of most continental tort regimes.128

Subsumed within the general

principle is the notion that a person in control of immovable property
received by a modem civilian or mixed jurisdiction from the Roman law, the standard of care
imposed on a landlord should reflect a contemporary policy assessment, and not slavish
repetition of historical norms. See in/Ta. Part TII.B.2.
1 20.

See, e.g., CODE CTVIL [C. crv.] art. 1721 (Fr.); BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]

[CIVIL CODE] §§ 536-536d (Ger.); MARiA

ESTHER BLAS LOPEZ, SPAIN 10, http://www.

eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/EuropeanP
rivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawSpain.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 20 1 0) (Spain);
ANDREAS FURRER & DAVID VASELLA, TENANCY LAW PROJECT-SWISS REPORT 29, http://
www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/Euro
peanPrivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawSwitzerland.pdf (last visited Nov. 1 3, 20 1 0).
1 2 1 . Palmer, supm note 49, at 28.
1 22 .
( 1 997).
1 23 .

See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE CIVIL LAW O F LEASE IN LOUISIANA § 3-6
See id; ParHIER, supm note 1 1 9, § 3-4.

1 24.

See PALMER, supm note 1 22, § 3-6; POTIUER, supra note 1 1 9, § 21 9.

1 25 .

ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 9, at 29 1 -92.

1 26 .

Id ; Cohn, supm note 1 0, a t 395.

1 27.
1 28 .

ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 9, at 292.
Id
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is liable for injuries caused to another by a dangerous condition on the
29
preffilses. 1
•

in the common law, the rationale for premises
tort stems at least in part from the obligor's control of the

In the civil law,
liability

in

premises.

as

However, unlike the historical common law landlord, the

civilian landlord is not absolved from tort liability by the mere
relinquishment of possession of the premises.

130

Rather, although the

landlord is not technically the occupier of the premises, the fact that
the landlord is obligated to deliver the premises in good repair and to
keep them in a safe condition maintains the element of control
necessary to preserve tort duties to all persons lawfully on the
premises.111 Thus the landlord's obligation in contract serves indirectly
as a basis for liability in tort.
As a general rule, civilian tenants have the ability to cumulate
their tort claims together with their contract claims, with the effect of
providing tenants the "best of both worlds." The prominent exception
falls under the French doctrine of non-cumul, under which
who has suffered

an

a

plaintiff

act that is simultaneously both a breach of a

contractual obligation and a delictual responsibility may only pursue
his

claim in contract.

132

Other jurisdictions freely permit the

cumulation of actions regardless of the theory of liability at issue.
Thus, in most systems of the civilian tradition, tenants may cumulate
contractual and tort claims to garner the full extent of the benefits of
each.
B

Modem Van'ations in MixedJunsdictions
To illustrate the modem variations on the civilian approach to

landlord liability, the regimes of three mixed jurisdictions-South
Africa, Scotland, and Louisiana-will be studied here.1 33 This analysis

1 29.

See R.G. MCKERRON,

THE LAW OF DELICT: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF

LIABILITY FOR CIVIL WRONGS IN THE LAW OF SournAFRJCA 240 (7th ed. 1971).

1 30.
131.

See Cohn, supm note
See id

1 32.

6 SAUL L!TVINOFF, LOUISIANA CML LAW TREATISE § 1 6.8 (1999). The doctrine

1 0, at 396.

of non-cumulis adhered to in France and in Belgium.
1 3 3.
Louisiana.

See id

The mixed jurisdictions studied in this Article are Scotland, South Afiica, and
Other mixed jurisdictions not explored here include Quebec, Puerto Rico, The

Philippi nes, Israel, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, St. Lucia, Mauritius,
and the Seychelles. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MlxED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE

4-5 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2001) [hereinafter PALMER, MlxED

THIRD L EGAL FAMILY
JURISDICTIONS).

Mixed jurisdictions have been described

comparative purpos es
tradition.

Ronald

J.

"

as

"fruitful laboratories for

due to their unique ability to selectively borrow from either legal

Scalise Jr.,

Undue Influence and the

Law

of Wills:

A

Comparative
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is useful for a number o f reasons. First, mixed jurisdictions have been
lauded for their value in comparative tort analysis, because "[t]ort is
the area par excellence of common law penetration" in mixed
systems. 134

Each of the mixed jurisdictions studied here has a tort

system firmly rooted in the Roman civil law, while at the same time
heavily influenced by the common law. 135

Thus, the efforts of these

jurisdictions to deal with the tort aspects of the landlord-tenant
relationship

are

jurisdictions, such

directly
as

influential

in

"pure"

common

law

those in the United States. Additionally, while

the law of South Africa and Scotland was heavily influenced by
seventeenth-century Dutch scholars, Louisiana law was more heavily
influenced by French and Spanish sources.136 While the basic elements
of the law of lease in each of these jurisdictions derives from a
common source-the Roman law--each jurisdiction's approach bears
the distinct markings of other, individual influences. Further, each of
the mixed jurisdictions studied here has a unique history and culture. 137
Because the observation of common legal trends among diverse
cultures can be quite telling, an analysis of the level of similarity or
difference across jurisdictional lines such as these is invaluable.138

1.

South Africa
The legal system in South Africa is a hybrid of civilian Roman

Dutch law and English common law. 139

However, the legal regime

governing the landlord-tenant relationship in South Africa is decidedly
civilian in character.

Many of the principles governing the landlord

tenant relationship are found in the uncodified principles of South
African law which, even today, are drawn directly from Justinian's
Digest and the commentaries of such seventeenth-century jurists as
Analysis, 19

DUKE J. COMP. & INT' L L. 41, l 03 (2008); see also VERNON VALENTINE PALMER,
LOU1SIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MrxEo JURISDICTION 3 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1 999);
ZIMMERMANN E T AL., supra note 8, preface at (vi); REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & DANIEL
VISSER, SOU THERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 2-3 (1996).
134. Vernon Valentine P almer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-Cultural
Setting: The Tort Experience ofLouisiana, 46 LoY. L. REV. 535, 535 (2000) ("The subject of
tor t in a mixed j urisdiction is of the greatest interest to the comparative lawyer and to those
interested in the modem ius commune.").
135. See PALMER, MlxEo JURISDICTIONS, supra note 1 33, at 118 (South Africa), 226
(Scotland), 303 (Louisiana).
136. Id at 118, 303.
137. See id at 4.
138. See id
139. For a detailed discussion of the history and elements of South African law, see
H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTI! AFRICAN LEGAL SYS TEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
329-596 (1968).
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Johannes Voet and Hugo Grotius. 140 Since the 1 920s, residential leases
have also been subject to a number of statutory controls designed for
the protection of tenants. 141 These statutes concern issues such as rent
control and rights of eviction, but do not touch upon the landlord's
responsibility for the condition of the premises. 142
According to established principles o f Roman-Dutch law, a
residential landlord owes two interconnected obligations to the tenant
relating to the condition of the premises:

the landlord must first

deliver the premises in a condition suitable for habitation and must
thereafter

maintain

the

premises

in

a

condition

suitable

for

habitation.143 In fact, the term "habitability" does not make its way into
the doctrinal writings or case reports involving these obligations.
Rather, the landlord's obligations are couched in terms of delivering
and maintaining the dwelling in a condition fit for the purpose for
which it was let, which in the case of residential lease, means that the
property must be fit for habitation.144
The landlord's breach of either the obligation to deliver or the
obligation of maintenance entitles the tenant to a number of traditional
contractual remedies, including dissolution of the lease, rent abate
ment, repair-and-deduct rights, and specific performance.145 However,
in South Africa, a tenant may only recover consequential damages if
the landlord either knew or ought to have known of the defect and
neglected to take reasonable measures to remedy it.146 Though some
jurisprudence has indicated that a landlord has constructive knowledge
of defects only when the landlord's trade or profession "renders him an
1 40.

See

ge nerally A.J. KERR, THE LAW OF

SALE AND LEASE (3d ed. 2004); COOPER,

supm note 1 1 9; see also HAHLo & KAHN, supra note 1 39, at 578-8 1 .
141 .

See ELLISON

KAHN

ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SALE

&

LEASE 94-97

( 1 998).
1 42.

See Rent Control Act 80 of 1976 (S. Afr.); Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (S.

1 43.

COOPER, supra note 1 1 9, at 85, 98.

Afr.).
1 44.

See 1d at 85.

145.

Id at 85-90. Although a lessee may in theory compel a lessor to place or

maintain the premises in good condition, South African courts (under the influence of
English law) hold that as a general rule an order of specific performance will not be granted
against a lessor. The justification advanced for this rule is that it would be difficult for a court

to enforce its order. This trend has been criticized by a leading commentator as inconsistent
with South African law.

Id at 89.
Id at 90; see also Hunter v. Cumnor Invs. 1952 ( 1 ) SA 735 (CPD) at 741 (S. Afr.)
("[T]he authorities appear to have intended to fix the lessor's liability on the basis of a neglect
1 46.

on his part. It is the knowledge of the defect on the part of the lessor coupled with a failure
by him to remedy the defect that fixes

him

with liability.

Mere knowledge, but with no

opportunity to act on that knowledge towards the remedying of the defect, would not render
the lessor liable for damage flowing from the unremedied defect.").
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expert in matters related t o building," other case law has suggested that
a landlord derives constructive knowledge "from the nature of his
occupation, or from the other circumstances." 141 In either case, a tenant
must essentially prove negligence on the part of the landlord before
recovering consequential damages on the contract, including damages
resulting from personal injury or property damage.
This negligence requirement appears to have originated in the
writings of seventeenth century European scholars interpreting the
48
The accuracy of these
relevant provisions of Roman law. 1
interpretations
scholars. 149

has
More

been

questioned by

importantly,

these

modern

same

South African

commentators

have

questioned the continuing theoretical validity of the fault-based rule.150
One contemporary justification for the negligence approach rests on
the ground that under South African law, liability for positive
malperformance-that is, failure to perform a contractual obligation,
whether express or implied by law-requires a showing of fault.151
Although contractual liability is usually thought of as strict in nature,
an obligor may avoid liability on a showing that his breach of contract
was the direct result of the act of a third party or a force beyond his
control.152 Thus, the fault requirement for recovery of consequential
damages resulting from a landlord's breach of the repair obligation is
justified on the ground that fault requirements exist throughout South
African contract law. 153 Another justification for the fault requirement
is made by analogy to the context of sales, in which sellers are liable
for defects in things sold to the extent they know or should know of the
defects.154 South African commentators have challenged both of these
justifications.155

Despite criticism of the fault requirement, courts

continue to require a showing of fault before a tenant is permitted to
147.

Compare Hunter,

1 952 ( 1 ) SA at 744,

with Nannucci v. Wilson & Co.

1 894 (4)

SC 233 (SC) at 234 (S. Afr.). This more lenient view is favored by modem commentators.
See COOPER, supra note 1 1 9, at 1 1 0 & n.82 (citing KERR, supra note 140, at 2 1 4).
148.

See COOPER, supra note

1 1 9, at 108-09. The rule appears to have originated from

the writings ofUlpian in the Digest.

See id (citing DIG. 1 9.2. 1 9. l (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32)).
See id; Andrew Domanski, Consequential Damages in Lease: Gingerly
SidesteppingAuthority, 104 SAU 3 1 1 , 3 1 1 - 1 2 (1 987).
1 50. Domanski, supra note 149, at 3 1 1 - 1 5 .
1 5 1 . J.G. Lotz, Lease, in 1 4 THE LAW O F SOUTH AFRICA § 146 CVV. A Joubert, ed.
1 98 1 ); A.D.J. Van Rensburg et al., Contract, in 5 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 1 5 1 ,
149.

para. 22 1 . Positive malperformance is contrasted with negative malperformance, which is the
failure to perform contractual obligations in a timely manner. Van Rensburg et al.,
1 52. Van Rensburg et al., supra note 1 5 1 , at para. 22 1 .
1 53.
1 54.
1 5 5.

Id
See COOPER, supra note
See id at 1 09- 1 0 .

1 1 9, at 109 & n.76.
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Strikingly, the issue of whether

fault-based or strict liability is more desirable from a contemporary
policy perspective appears to have been all but completely ignored.157

In addition to the action in contract, an aggrieved tenant may
bring a tort claim against a landlord for damages resulting from

a

defect in the premises. South African law recognizes that owners and
occupiers of land and buildings owe a general obligation to take
reasonable care for the safety of persons who lawfully come onto the
property. 158 As a general rule, the owner of property is responsible for
its condition on the basis that the owner exercises control over the
premises.159

But even when the premises are let, the landlord's

obligation to maintain the premises in a safe condition constitutes
sufficient control over the premises to subject the owner to tort
liability, though the landlord is not in possession of the premises.160
Thus, the landlord owes to the tenant the duty to keep the premises "as
safe for [the purpose of the lease] as reasonable care and skill on the
part of any one can make them."161

Similarly, the landlord owes an

obligation of reasonable care to third parties who are lawfully on the
162
premises.
•

Very few reported cases involve claims for consequential
damages arising from breach of the landlord's contractual obligations.
The paucity of litigation on this issue may stem from the fact that
South African law generally prohibits recovery of nonpecuniary
damages in breach of contract claims and instead relegates recovery of
so-called general damages-that is, damages for pain and suffering1 5 6. See, e.g., Fourie NO v. Hansen & Another 2001 (2) SA 823 (WLD) at 826;
Minette Nortje, Law ofLease, 2001 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 270, 272-73 (2001).
1 5 7 . See, e.g., Domanski, supra note 149, at 3 1 2:

Strict liability would, no doubt, be harsh on the lessor in certain circumstances, but
the exploration of that issue falls outside the scope of this note. Suffice it to say
that, in practice, most lessors would be well able to protect themselves, either by
the insertion of an appropriate clause in the agreement of lease or by way of
insurance.
The tendency to focus on the historical and theoretical accuracy of the rule may be explained
in light of the fact that in South Africa, many legal writings from centuries past are still
routinely utilized in modem dispute resolution. See Zimmermann, supra note 8, at 4 (noting
that here, "legal history and modem legal doctrine have not categorically been 'thought
apart"').
1 5 8 . McKERRON, supm note 129, at 240.
1 59 .

Id

See 1d; Cape Town Municipality v. Paine l 923 SA 207(A) at 209-1 0 (S. Afr.).
1 6 1 . McKERRON, supm note 1 29, at 241 (quoting Maclenan v. Segar [1 917] 2 K.B.
325 at 333 (Eng.)).
1 62. See 1d at 242.
1 60 .
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to the province of tort law.163 Thus, although theoretically a tenant may
seek redress for personal injuries under a contract theory, damages will
be limited to recovery of pecuniary losses, such as out-of-pocket
medical expenses. Moreover, because the tenant is required to make a
showing that the landlord was negligent in failing to deliver or
maintain the premises in a safe condition, the tenant does not have the
benefit of a more favorable standard of liability on the contract claim.
Additionally, because the statute of limitations applicable to claims in
both contract and tort is three years, the contract theory does not afford
a longer period of time in which to sue.164
The only benefit of the contract action, from the tenant's point of
view, concerns the defenses the landlord can raise to prevent or reduce
the tenant's recovery. In the contractual setting, the principle of volenti

non fit mjun8-essentially, assumption of the risk-applies to entirely
bar the plaintiff's recovery. 165 In order to successfully invoke this
defense, the landlord must meet the difficult burden of proving that the
tenant clearly consented to the risk of injury. 166 In the tort setting, the
analysis of the plaintiff's behavior is more complex.

Contributory

negligence applies in suits involving tort responsibility predicated on
negligence, and therefore, the behavior of the tenant may serve to
reduce the percentage of fault allocated to the landlord.167 Contributory
negligence has thus far been restricted to the tort context in South
Africa, and is not applied to contractual claims.168

However, at least

some commentators espouse the view that comparative fault should
apply to any contractual breach that is predicated on the defendant's

fa.ult 169 As articulated by one author, the application of comparative
1 63. J.R. DU

STUDY OF
A GUIDE FOR BEGINNERS 95 (2d ed. 1 989); A.J. KERR, THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 607-08 (4th ed. 1989); Cohn, supra note 10, at 395 & n.91
(quoting R. G. MCKERRON, THE L AW OF DELICT 22 (3d ed. 1 947)).
1 64. Prescription Act 68 of 1969 § 1 1 (S. Afr.).
1 65. COOPER, supra note 1 19, at 1 1 l .
1 66. See, e.g, Tee v. Mcilwraith, 1905 ( 1 9) EDC 282 at 289 (S. Afr.); Anlln v.
Ebrahim, 1 926(47) NLR I at 7 (S. Afr.).
1 67. l PQ.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF DELICT 652-53 ( 1 984).
1 68. Id at 656. The Supreme Court of Appeal most recently addressed this issue in
Thoroughbred Breeders ' Ass 1.l v. Price Watemouse 2001 (4) SA 55 1 (SCA). According to
the court, the Apportionment of Damages Act was specifically designed to alter the effect of
contributory negligence and the last opportunity rule, both of which were completely
unknown to the South African law of torts. Id Therefore, "the Act was designed to address
and correct a particular mischief that was identified as such within the law of delict . . . it was
confined to that particular mischief; and that the corresponding problem . . . might arise
within the law of contract was never within the legislature's compass." Id at 590.
1 69. See SA Law Commission Project 96 The Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of
1956, § 4. 1 22 (July 2003) (S. Afr.), http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj96_report_
PLESSIS & L. KOK, AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO THE

SOUTH AFRICAN LAW:

2 0 1 0]

443

LANDLORD LIABILITY

fault in the contract context "should be . . . all the more necessary in
the light of the recent tendency to 'blend' contractual and delictual
liability."110 Thus a plausible argument may be made by a landlord in
an appropriate case for the extension of comparative fault principles to
temper a tenant's recovery in contract.

Such a case has not yet been

decided.
Given that courts are reluctant to find sufficient evidence of
consent to apply the doctrine

volenti n on fit injuria to bar

a tenant's

claim, the tenant's likelihood of success may be greater in an action on
the contract. On the other hand, given that the tenant may not recover
for nonpecuniary losses for pain and suffering in an action on the
contract, and that the standard of care and statute of limitations are
identical in both tort and contract, a tenant has little incentive to utilize
a contractual theory of recovery when a tort theory is concurrently
available.
An additional distinction between tort-based and contractual
theories of recovery is the respective availability of each theory to third
parties who are not signatories to the lease. An action for breach of
contract exists only in favor of the tenant.111

Therefore, family

members or guests of the tenant who are injured due to the landlord's
breach of contractual obligations must pursue their claims in tort
alone. 172
The South African approach to landlord liability for defective
premises is characterized by rigid maintenance of the line
demarcation between contract and tort.

of

This staunch separation,

coupled with the particular attributes of tort and contract under South
African law, has led to the marked underutilization of the contract
theory of recovery for consequential losses resulting from breach of
the landlord's obligation to deliver and maintain the premises in a
tenantable condition.
2.

Scotland
Scotland's mixed legal system, like that of South Africa, was

initially heavily influenced by the Roman-Dutch law as articulated by
2003jul.pdf; BOBERG, supra note 1 67, at 7 1 3 ; Louise Tager, General Pdnciples of Contract,
1976 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 67, 87-88 ( 1976); McKERRON, supra note 129, at 248; P.Q.R.
Boberg, Law ofDelict, 1965 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 1 74, 1 79-80 ( 1965); Jean Davids, Altered
Cheques: Apportionment ofLoss, 82 SALJ 289 (1965).
170. BOBERG, supra note 1 67, at 713; see also M.M. Loubser, Concurrence of
Contract andDehct, 8 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 1 13, 1 37 (1997).
1 7 1 . McKERRON, supra note 1 29, at 241 .
1 72. Id at 24 1-42.
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authorities such as Grotius and Voet. 173 And, as i n South Africa, many
tenets

of the

landlord-tenant relationship

are

governed

by

an

uncodified body of case law and doctrinal writings.114 A number of
statutes designed to impose additional obligations on landlords not
recognized under the Scottish common l aw have also been enacted
within the past century.175
The Scottish land law imposes an implied obligation on the
landlord to deliver the premises to the tenant in a condition reasonably
fit for 'the purpose of the lease.176

In the case of urban tenancies,

fitness for use translates to a requirement that the premises be wind
and

water-tight,

condition.177

and

in

a

reasonably

habitable

or

tenantable

Moreover, the jurisprudence has further developed the

notion of habitability and has tied the concept to human safety.

As

articulated by the Court of Session of Scotland, the landlord's
obligation "include[ s] seeing that there [is] no part of the subjects in a
condition likely to endanger the tenant."118

If the landlord fails to

deliver the premises in a fit condition, the tenant can repudiate the
1
lease or demand a reduction in the rent. 19 Scottish landlords also owe
a continuing duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition
throughout the lease term.180

If the tenant discovers a defect, the
181
If the

landlord is given a reasonable time in which to repair it.

landlord fails to do so, the tenant is entitled to dissolve the lease or
claim an abatement of rent.182

In either case, the tenant may claim

damages.183
A unique aspect of the Scottish approach is that the standard of
care imposed depends on whether the landlord failed to deliver the
premises in a habitable condition, or whether the landlord failed to

maintain the premises

in a habitable condition. In the former case, the

landlord is strictly liable for the tenant's losses regardless of whether
1 73.
1 74.

Zimmennann,

sup.m note 8, at 9-10.
See id
1 75 . See Housing (Scotland) Act, 1987, c . 26; Housing (Scotland) Act, 1 988, ch. 43;
Housing (Scotland) Act, 2001 (A.S.P. I O); The Landlord's Repairing Obligations (Specified
Rent) (Scotland), 1988, S.I. 1 988/2 1 55.
1 76 .

WILLIAM M. GORDON, SCITTTISH LAND LAW 572 (2d ed. 1 999); G. CAMPBELL H.

PATON & JOSEPH G.S. CAMERON, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANf IN SC<ITLAND 130
( 1 967).
1 77.

GORDON,

1 78.

Lamb v. Glasgow Dist. Council, (1 978) S.L.T. 64, 64 (Scot.).

supra note 1 76, at 572.

1 79.

PATON & CAMERON,

1 80.
181.

GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 572; PAJDN & CAMERON,
PATON & CAMERON, supra note 1 76, at 1 32.

1 82.
1 83 .

supra note 1 76, at 1 32.

Id

Hugo & Simpson,

supra note 1 0, at 3 1 7-18.

sup.m note 176, at 1 3 1 -32.
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the landlord knew or should have known of the defect causing harm.184
In the latter case, however, a landlord's liability has long been

considered conditioned upon actual or constructive knowledge of the
defect at issue.185 In other words, a landlord is liable for harm arising
from a later-arising defect only if it is one of which the landlord knew
or should have known, and was negligent in failing to repair.

The

notice requirement for later-arising defects is justified on the ground
that the landlord is not in possession of the premises, and thus should
not be held liable for defects for which no practical means of discovery
exists.186
The common law obligations of landlords in some classes of
urban housing have been supplemented by statutes over the course of
the last century. 181 The statutes provide that the contract of lease shall
include an implied condition that the house is "in all respects
reasonably fit for human habitation," both at the commencement of the
tenancy, and during the lease.188 Like the common law obligation, the
statutory obligation is tied to human safety. A recent Court of Session
opinion confirmed the
criterion as follows:

long-held interpretation of the statutory

"If the state of repair of a house is such that by

ordinary [use,] damage may naturally be caused to the occupier, either
in respect of personal injury to life or limb or injury to health, then the
house is not in all respects reasonably fit for human habitation."189 As

under the common l aw, the landlord is strictly liable for defects that
existed at the time of leasing, and only upon notice during the
pendency of the lease.190

Thus, with respect to the definition of

habitability and the standards of care, the common law and statutory
obligations mirror each other.

The primary benefit of the statutory

1 84. 13 THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCWPAEDIA § 254 (Sir
Thomas Smith et al. eds., 1992).
1 85. PATON & CAMERON, supra note 1 76, at 1 32.
1 86. Todd v. Clapperton, (2009] CSOH 1 12 [ 1 14]; (2009) S.C. 1 1 2, 1 14 (Scot.).
1 87. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 573.
1 88. Housing (Scotland) Act, 1 987, c. 26, sch. I 0, iJ 1 (2). The statutory repairing
obligations apply to tenancies with a weekly rental of at least £300 per week and a term of
less than three years. Id; The Landlord's Repairing Obligations (Specified Rent) (Scotland),
1 988, S.l. 1 988/2 1 55. Most residential leases in Scotland are initially made for periods much
shorter than three years. Tenants who remain on the premises after the expiration of the initial
term usually do so through tacit relocation. In these circumstances, the statutory obligations
still apply. See Comm on Law Tenanc y Rights, SHELTER SCOTLAND, http://scotland.shelter.
org. uk/getadvice/advice_topics/rentin�rights/common_law_tenancies/common_law_tenanc
y_rights (last updated July 23, 2010).
1 89. Todd, [2009) CSOH at 1 14; (2009) SC at 1 14 (quoting Summers v. Salford Corp.
[ 1 943) A.C. 283 (H.L.) 289 (appeal taken from Eng.)).
1 90. Id
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scheme is that the obligations it imposes are not waivable,191 in contrast
to the common law obligations, which can be freely altered by the
parties.192
Under the Scottish common law, only the tenant is protected by
the landlord's contractual obligations relating to the condition of the
premises.

Family members and guests of the tenant have no

contractual recourse against the landlord for failure to deliver the
premises in a condition fit for habitation or to effect necessary
repairs.193 However, l andowners have always owed tort duties of care to
others under Scottish law. Initially, the obligation was a general duty
of care.194

In 1 929, the House of Lords imposed on Scotland the

English classifications of invitees, licensees, and trespassers, and the
varying duties owed to each.195

This change was met with sharp

criticism and was ultimately overturned with the enactment of special
legislation reinstating a standard of reasonable care. 196 This legislation
specifically subjects landlords to the same standard of care as
landowners in possession of their premises.197

Thus, landlords are

liable in tort not only to tenants, but also to any person lawfully on the
8
prerruses. 19
•

For several reasons, whether a tenant seeks recompense under a
tort or contract theory is largely irrelevant. First, the tenant is entitled
to recover nonpecuniary losses, including damages for pain and
suffering, in contract as well as in tort.199

Although contractual

I 9 I . Housing (Scotland) Act I 987, sch. I 0, ii I (2). By way of exception, the parties
petition the sheriff to approve the exclusion or modification of statutory obligations,
which may be granted if the sheriff is satisfied that the proposed modification is reasonable.
Id ii 5.
I 92. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 572.
193. DAVID M. WALKER, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS IN
ScOTLAND 450 (3d ed. I 995); Cameron v. Young ( 1 907) S.C. 475, 476-77 (Scot.). However,
one commentator has opined that the statutory repair obligations protect "not merely tenants
but those whom a landlord should reasonably foresee might use the house." DAVID M.
WALKER, THE LAW OF DELICT IN SCOTLAND 596 (2d ed. 1 98 I) [hereinafter WALKER, DELICT].
1 94. WALKER,DELICT, supra note 193, at 579.
1 95. Id
1 96. Occupiers ' Liability (Scotland) Act, I 960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, §§ 1-2.
1 97. Id § 3.
I 98. At one time, Scottish jurisprudence held that the tenant was protected only by
contract and not by the law of tort. WALKER, DELICT, supra note 1 93, at 596-97; see, e.g.,
Proctor v. Cowlairs Coop. Soc'y Ltd. ( 1 961) S.L.T. 434, 434. This view was met with some
criticism, and today is obsolete, as the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 protects "any
persons who or whose property may from time to time be on the premises." Occupiers'
Liability (Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, § 3(1 ).
199. See Eric Clive & Dale Hutchison, Breach ofContract, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS,
supra note 8, at 1 84-85; SCOITISH LAW COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON REMEDIES FOR
may
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recovery for mere mental distress is a relatively new phenomenon in
Scottish law, contractual claims for pain and suffering damages
associated with personal injury date back over one hundred years.200 In
fact, the earliest cases permitting contractual recovery for personal
injuries involved either breaches of the landlord's repair obligations or
of the seller's warranty of fitness.201 Second, the statute of limitations
applicable to causes of action for personal injury is three years,
regardless of whether the action is founded in contract or in tort.202
Claims for damage to property must be made within five years, again
regardless of the theory of liability.203 Thus a tenant gains no distinct
advantage by suing either in tort or on the contract, and with regard to
the type of damages recoverable or the period of time during which
suit may be brought, the contractual claim of the tenant and the tort
claim brought by a spouse or on behalf of a child are indistinguishable.
On the other hand, the contractual and tort actions differ signifi
cantly in two key respects.

First,

as

discussed above, the landlord is

strictly liable in contract for defects existing at the time the leased
premises is delivered to the tenant. Thus, the applicable standard of
care may significantly affect whether a tenant, on the one hand, or a
child or spouse, on the other, may recover for an injury caused by such
a defect.

Second, the defenses available to the landlord in the

contractual realm are quite different from those available in the tort
realm. A tenant's contractual claim is barred entirely by the doctrine of

volenti non fit inju.ria.

Thus, if a tenant is injured by a defect of which

the tenant is aware or which is obvious, recovery is entirely barred.204
More specifically, the prevailing jurisprudential rule is that a tenant
who continues to occupy the premises in the presence of a known
defect cannot recover unless that continued occupation rests on a belief
that repairs will be carried out immediately.205 This rule is predicated

BREACH OF CONTRACT para. 8.23 (Apr. 1 999), available at http://www.scotlaw.gov.uk/down
load_file/view/92/.
200. Vernon Val entine Palmer, Contracts ofIntellectual Gratification-A Louisiana
Scot!and Creation, in MIXED JURJSDICTIONS COMPARED: PRrvATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND
SCOTLAND 208, 219-20 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009).
20 I . See, e.g., Cameron v. Young (1 907) S.C. 475, 475-80 ( Scot.); Dickie v. Amicable
Prop. Inv. Bldg. Soc'y ( 1 9 1 1 ) S.C. 1 079, 1083-84 (Scot.); Fitzpatrick v. Barr, ( 1 948) S.L.T.
( Sh. Ct.) 5, 5 (Scot.).
202. Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act, 1 973 § 1 7(1 )(a).
203. Id § 6 & sch. 1 .
204. PATON & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 1 32. As stated by one court, "[T]he law
does not hold a landlord of house property to be in the position of an insurer of the safety of
his tenants." Meehan v. Watson ( 1 906) S.C. (Sh. Ct.) 28, 30 (Scot.).
205. PAlDN & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 132.
,
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on the view that a tenant who discovers a dangerous defect in the
premises should "repudiate the lease and go to live elsewhere."206 In
contrast, in a tort suit brought by a nontenant, such as a tenant's family
member or a guest, the doctrine of contributory negligence applies,
and the plaintiff's recovery may be lessened proportionately based
upon the failure to take reasonable care to avoid the risk of harm.201
By virtue of these differences, the injured tenant has a much
stronger claim than a third party such as a family member or
roommate. In a case in which the defect involved arose prior to the
delivery of the leased premises, a tenant's claim would lie in strict
liability, while that of a spouse, child, or guest would lie in negligence
alone. Further, regardless of the standard of care involved, the tenant's
claim is subject to bar only when the tenant "freely and voluntarily,
with full knowledge o f the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it."208
In contrast, a claim by a nontenant is much more likely to be reduced,
perhaps to a great extent, by evidence establishing the less onerous
standard of failure to take reasonable care.209
Perhaps more than in other jurisdictions, the distinction between
the tenant's claim and that of a family member is not merely academic.
In Scotland, the most litigated claims by tenants concerning the
condition of the premises involve asthma contracted either by the
tenant or, more frequently, the tenant's children, as a result of
dampness and condensation.210 Any disadvantage to the child's claim

206. Hughes' Tutrix v. Glasgow Dist. Council, ( 1 982) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 70, 72 (Scot.).
207. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1 945, C. 28, § 1 ( 1 ) (Eng.).
208. Morton v. Glasgow City Council, (2007) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 8 1 , 84 (Scot.)
(distinguishing contributory negligence from the doctrine volenti non fit injuria).
209. Fascinatingly, the assumption of risk defense may apply to the tenant's action
even ifthe tenant sues in tort. This is because the statute specifically authorizing tort liability
for landlords contains a provision that appears to retain the defense. Occupier's Liability
(Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, § 2(3) ("Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this
Act shall be held to impose on an occupier any obligation to a person entering on his
premises in respect of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his; and any question
whether a risk was so accepted shall be decided on the same principles as in other cases in
which one person owes to another a duty to show care."); see Hughes ' Tutrix, (1 982) S.L.T. at
72-74. One commentator suggests, however, that in the tort action, "only clear evidence of
voluntary acceptance of specific known risks . . . could be sufficient to make the maxim
applicable." WALKER, DELICT, supra note 193, at 348.
2 1 0. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 573; STIRLING HOWIBSON, HOUSING & ASTHMA 1 8284 (2005); Court Action If Disrepair ls Damaging lliur Health, SHELTER SCOTLAND, http://
scotland.shelter.org.uk/getadvice/advice_topics/repairs_and_bad_conditions/taking_court_act
ion_over_repairs/court_action_if_disrepair_is_damaging_your_health? (last updated July 23,
20 1 0).
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stemming from its classification as tort-based rather than contractual is
difficult to justify.

21 1

In sum, Scotland, much like South Africa, retains a relatively

staunch line between the contractual and tort claims against landlords
for defective premises.

However, whereas in South Africa, the

differences between the theories are not highlighted due to the
infrequency of contractual claims, in Scotland, where contractual
claims are more prevalent, the differences are underscored and thus
more noticeably call for reconsideration.

3.

Louisiana
Louisiana enjoys its status

as

a mixed jurisdiction due to the fact

that while much of its private law originated in French and Spanish
sources, it also has been heavily inundated with American influences.212
Louisiana's law of lease is similar to that of the French Civil Code, and
though it was extensively revised in 2005, it continues to reflect many
of the same concepts as the Roman law.213

Unlike most modem

jurisdictions (whether civil, common, or mixed), Louisiana does not
employ a special statutory regime under which residential leases are
govemed.214 Thus the residential lease is governed primarily by the
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code.215
Drawing from the Roman law, the Louisiana Civil Code imposes
significant obligations on the landlord with respect to the initial
suitability and the continued maintenance of leased property.

The

landlord is required to deliver the thing in a condition "suitable for the
purpose for which it is leased," which, in the residential context,

211.

Although the unavailability of the strict liability theory to children is troublesome,

it should be noted that contributory negligence is rarely assessed against children, and the
contributory fault of a parent is not applied to the detriment of the child's action for recovery.
Hughcs ' Tutrix, ( 1 982) S.L.T. at 74-75; WALKER, DELICT, supr a note 193, at 368.
2 1 2.

Vernon Valentine Palmer, T1ro Worlds in One: The Genesis ofLowsi ana s Mixed

Legal System,

1803-1812, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MlxED JURISDICTION 23-39

(Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1 999).
213.

Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of

1808:

Its Actual S ources and

Present R elevance, 46 TuL. L. REv. 4, 43 ( 1 97 1 ) ; Paul du Plessis, Of Mice (an d Other
Disasters) and Men-Rent Abatement Due to Unforeseen and Uncontrollable Events
Civilian Tradition,

in the

17 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 1 3, 1 3 5, 1 38, 149 (2002 ).

2 1 4. This is the case despite the call for such a regime by the academic commentary.
See Palmer, supra note 49, at 3 8 .
215.

Various ancillary statutes relating t o residential leases are found i n the Louisiana

Revised Statutes, Title 9.
3 260-6 1 (20 1 0).

See LA. REv. STAT.

ANN. §§ 9:322 1 , 324 1 , 325 1-54, 3258-3259.2,
infra at notes 230-234 and accompanying

With one exception discussed

text, none of these provisions addresses the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises.
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translates to habitation.216 The landlord is also required to maintain the
habitability of the premises through the making of necessary repairs to
the premises,211 and warranting against vices or defects which may
arise during the pendency of the lease.218 The landlord's failure with
respect to any of these obligations may entitle the tenant to obtain
dissolution of the lease,219 as well

as

to claim actual and consequential

damages resulting from a landlord's failure to perform.220 A landlord's
breach of the repair obligation may also entitle the tenant to demand
repairs or to make repairs and deduct the amount expended from the
rent provided the repairs were necessary and the amount expended
reasonable.221 The addition of the ''warranty" against vices and defects
in Louisiana law, which does not appear in either Scotland or South
Africa, adds an additional level of analysis to a landlord's liability.222
The landlord's standard of care in warranty is one of strict liability,
given that the landlord is liable to the tenant even in the absence of
knowledge of the defect or any negligence in failing to discover it.223
Notably, under current law, the parties may not contractually alter
the warranty against vices and defects in residential leases if that
waiver would insulate the landlord from liability for defects that
"seriously affect health or safety" or in cases involving physical
injury.224 The statutory restriction against waiver is new and was added

2 1 6. LA. C!v. CODE ANN. art. 2684 (201 0).
2 1 7. Id art. 2691.
2 1 8. Id art. 2696.
2 1 9. Id art. 27 19; GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, LOUISIANA LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW
§ 7 . 1 (1 992).
220. LA. CIY. CODEANN. art. 1 994; ARMSTRONG, supra note 2 1 9, § 7.22.
22 1 . LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694; ARMSTRONG, supra note 2 1 9, § 7.22.
222. The warranty derives immediately from the French Civil Code, which is itself
drawn from the writings of Pothier. John C. Morris, Jr., Comment, Lessor's Liability for
Personal Injuries, 7 LA. L. REv: 406, 407 ( 1 947). The French Civil Code provides:
A warranty is due to the tenant for all vices or defects of the thing leased which
prevent use of it, although the lessor did not know of them at the time of the lease .
Where any loss results to the lessee from those vices or defects, the lessor is
obliged to indemnify him.
CODE CML [C. crv.]

art. 172 1

(Fr.);

see also POTHIER, supra. note 1 1 9, §§ 109-120.

However,

the imposition of strict liability on the landlord for consequential loss does not necessarily
follow from Pothier's treatise.

PonIIER,

supra note 1 1 9, § § 1 1 8-1 20.

Some commentators

have observed that the strict liability standard adopted in the French Civil Code represents a
departure from the Roman law requirement of fault for consequential loss.
note

10, at 38 1 .
223. LA.

Crv. CODE ANN . art.

See Cohn, supra

2697 ('The warranty . . . also encompasses vices or
see, e.g., Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 950243, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 0/26/95); 663 So. 2d 5 1 5, 5 1 9.
224. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2004(2), 2699(2)-(3).
defects that are not known to the lessor.");
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during the

2005 overhaul of the law of lease in recognition of the fact

that most Western jurisdictions, whether common law or civilian,
prohibit waivers of obligations relating to habitability in residential
leases.225 Prior to the

2005 revision, Louisiana courts were reluctant to
Although

uphold waivers of the landlord's repair obligations.226

restrictions on contractual waivers are contrary to the general principle
of contractual freedom, Louisiana courts recognized that residential
tenants have relatively little bargaining power and are therefore
deserving of protection from the possibility of an unfair imposition of
a contractual waiver of their rights.221

Another effect of the

revision was the extension of contractual protection in

2005

warranty

beyond the confines of privity to "all persons who reside in the
premises in accordance with the lease."228 This new provision clearly
extends the protection of contractual privity to family members as well
as roommates who are not related by blood or marriage.229
Although guests of the tenant do not receive the benefit of the
contractual scheme, landowners have always owed tort obligations to
protect the public from harm resulting from dangerous conditions on
the premises.230 This obligation stems not from the so-called "general
clause," according to which everyone is liable for whatever damage is
caused by fault, but instead comprises a special type of tort liability
governing damage caused by the ruin of a building.231

Under the

applicable provisions of law, the owner of a building is liable for any
"damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to
repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its original
construction."232
This liability was at one time strict in character, but recent tort
reform initiatives have reduced the standard of care in tort to one of
negligence, so that now

an

owner is only liable for damages which

could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, but were
not.2·13

As a result, under current law, the landlord's liability to the

225. See 1d art. 2699 cmt. g (2005).
226. ARMSTRONG, supra note 2 1 9, § 7.21.
227. Id (citing Moity v. Guillory, 430 So. 2d 1 243 (La. Ct. App. 1983)).
228. LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 2698; ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING, LoUISIANA
l.A.W OF SALE AND LE ASE: A PRECIS § 3 . 1 .2 (2007).
229. Prior to the revision, Louisiana courts were split on the issue of whether the
tenant's family and guests could recover under a contractual breach of warranty theory or
whether their claims were relegated to tort. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 219, § 8.5 1 .
230. LA. Ov. CODE ANN. arts. 23 1 7, 23 1 7. l , 2322.
23 1 . Compare id. art. 23 1 5 with id. arts. 23 17, 23 1 7. 1 , 2322.
232. Id art. 2322.
233. 1 996 La. Acts I § 1 .
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tenant and others residing at the premises lies in strict liability, while
liability to others lawfully on the premises lies in negligence only.234
The distinction between a landlord's liability in contract and in tort
does not end with the standard of care, however. Louisiana retains a
bifurcated limitation of claims scheme under which contractual actions
are subject to a limitations period of ten years, while tort claims are
.
D5
sub�ect to a mere one year.
The line between contract and tort in Louisiana is not so bright,
however; the intermingling of tort and contract concepts is seen in
several important instances.

In the strict contractual setting, that is,

when a tenant demands dissolution of a lease or economic damages for
failure to effect repairs, the meaning of a "defect" is tied to the "cause
of the contract."236

In other words, if the defect prevents the leased

premises from being used as intended by the parties, then the defect is
actionable.

When a tenant seeks contractual recovery for personal

injuries, however, dangerousness and the foreseeability of injury have
been factored in to determine whether the cause of the injury was in
fact a compensable "defect."237

Here, the very meaning of the term

"defect" is derived from the law of tort.238

Thus, whether a tenant

pursues a personal injury claim under a contract or tort theory of
recovery, the central question is whether the defect at issue presents an
unreasonable risk of harm that can be anticipated through normal use
of the premises.239 Occasionally, courts even employ the doctrine o f res

234. Driscoll v. Provenzano, 01 -1 1 15, p.l (La. 6/1/0 1 ); 793 So. 2d 20 1 , 201 (Calogero,
CJ., concurring); Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments P'ship, 38,33 1 , pp. 6-7 (La. App. 2 Cir.
417104); 870 So. 2d 490, 494-95 (finding that tort reform legislation reducing tort standard of
care to negligence did not impact strict liability standard of care applicable to landlords in
contract).
235. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3499 (applying ten-year prescriptive period to
personal actions, including contracts) with art. 3492 (applying one-year prescriptive period to
tort actions). Louisiana's prescription regime has been criticized as both complex and
inequitable. See Benjamin West Janke, The Failure ofLouisiana s Bi!Urcated Liberative
Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. R.Ev. 620, 672 (2008).
236. PALMER, supro note 1 22, § 3 . 1 7.
237. Id; ARMSTRONG, supro note 2 1 9, § 8.2 1 .
2 3 8 . PALMER, supro note 1 22, § 3 . 1 8.
239. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1 1 34, 1 337-38 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1984) (finding lessor's liability for vices and defects analyzed in terms of negligence
because the result is "the same"); see also Barnes, 38,33 1 at p. 5 n.3; 870 So. 2d at 494 n.3;
Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 95-0243, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 0/26/95); 663 So. 2d
5 1 5, 5 1 9; Zanders v. Lambert, 5 14 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987); Ivey v. Hous.
Auth. of Mansfield, 5 14 So. 2d 66 1 , 663-64 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1 987); Wood v. Cambridge Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1 129, 1 1 32 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1 986); Gallagher v. Favrot, 499 So. 2d
1205, 1 207-08 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1 986).
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in the contract setting to find a presumption of

defectiveness that must be rebutted by the landlord.240
Recovery for breach of the landlord's tort obligations clearly
extends to nonpecuniary damages such as those for pain and
suffering.241

And, in the contract setting, courts have awarded

nonpecuniary damages stemming from a tenant's anxiety, worry, and
loss of time occasioned by the defect.242

Whether personal injury

damages are recoverable in the contract setting is less clear.

The

jurisprudence tends to deal with personal injuries in the lease setting
under the rubric of tort.243

However, many of the cases deal with

personal injuries to tenants ' family members, who lack contractual
privity with the landlord, and before the

2005

revisions could not

recover on a breach of warranty theory. Thus, the past tendency of the
courts to apply a tort theory to third-party claims is not necessarily
indicative of any reluctance to award nonpecuniary damages on the
contract in the proper case.

Even in those cases involving physical

injury to the tenant rather than a third party, the courts ' utilization of a
tort theory does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of contractual
recovery in this context, since the tenant has both tort and contract
theories at his disposal.
The Louisiana Civil Code generally restricts recovery in contract
for nonpecuniary loss to a small subset of contracts.

Nonpecuniary

damages are allowed when the contract, due to its nature or the intent
of the parties, is intended to "gratify a nonpecuniary interest" of the
obligee so long as the obligor either knew or should have known of
that interest.244 The Louisiana Supreme Court has made clear that the
240. See, e.g., Keller v. Kelly, 378 So. 2 d 1 006, 1008 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 979), writ
denied, 380 So. 2d 624 (La. 1980).
24 1. See, e.g, Davis v. Hochfelder, 95 So. 598, 599 (La. 1 923) (delict); Breen v.
Walters, 91 So. 50, 52-53 (La. 1922) (delict); Badie v. Columbia Brewing Co., 77 So. 768,
771 (La. 1 9 1 8) (delict); Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 72 So. 5 1 3, 5 14-1 6 (La. 1916)
(delict); Warren v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 190 So. 855, 858 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1 939) (delict).
242. See, e.g., Gennings v. Newton, 567 So. 2d 637, 642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 990); Smith
v. Castro Bros., 443 So. 2d 660, 661 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 983).
243. See, e.g, Davis, 95 So. at 599; Breen, 91 So. at 52-53; Badie, 77 So. at 77 1 ;
Boutte, 72 So. at 514-16; Warren, 190 So. at 858.
244. LA. Crv. CODE .ANN. art. 1998 (2010) provides:
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because of its
nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the
circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract,
the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would cause
that kind of loss. Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the
feelings of the obligee.
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nonpecuniary

interest

of the

obligee

must

be

"significant."245

Prototypical examples of this type of contract include those for the
tailoring of a wedding dress,246 funerary services,247 and nursing care
services. 248 One line of cases bearing directly on residential tenancy
involves contracts for the sale or repair of homes.

In this line of

decisions, Louisiana courts have awarded nonpecuniary damages to
litigants who successfully allege that the contract for sale or repair was
made in order to fulfill the ''American Dream" of home ownership, or
the home was characterized as the owner's "dream home."249 Applying
these decisions by analogy, in the proper case, a residential tenant may
seek nonpecuniary damages for emotional distress resulting from the
landlord's breach of his contractual obligations of maintenance. 250 One
Louisiana court of appeal has gone so far as to suggest that all
residential leases involve nonpecuniary aspects, stating: "A lease for
residential purposes includes, as one of its objects, the enjoyment of
habitable living quarters, arguably a nonpecuniary interest."251
The sale and repair line of decisions does not, however, address
whether pain and suffering damages resulting from personal injury are
awardable on a contract theory. Louisiana's experience with personal
injury damages in the products liability setting i s instructive here.
Under early products liability jurisprudence, a buyer injured by a
defective product was entitled to sue for damages in both tort and
contract.252 The case law initially required an injured buyer to bring a
contractual claim for contractual remedies and a tort claim for personal
injuries suffered.253

Later cases upheld contractual awards

for

245. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1 123, 1 1 33-34 (La. 1 992).
246. Lewis v. Hohnes, 34 So. 66, 68 (La. 1 903).
247. Robinson v. Providence Mausoleum, Inc., 359 So. 2d 1 3 1 7, 1 3 1 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1978).
248. Free v. Franklin Guest Home, Inc., 463 So. 2d 865, 874 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985).
249. See, e.g., Heath v. Brandon Homes, Inc., 36, 1 84 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02); 825
So. 2d 1262; Austin Homes, Inc. v. Thibodeaux, 01-1282 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02); 82 1 So. 2d
IO; Thomas v. Desire Cmty. Hous. Corp., 98-2097 (La. App. 4 Cir. 711 9/00); 773 So. 2d 755;
Mayerhofer v. Three R's Inc., 597 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1 992); Ditcharo v. Stepanek,
538 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1 989).
250. However, in at least one case, a Louisiana court has refused to allow a tenant
suing on a breach of contract theory to recover mental anguish damages in the absence of
physical injury. Gele v. Markey, 379 So. 2d 763, 764-65 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979).
25 1 . Ganheart v. Exec. House Apartments, 95-1 278 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/1 5/96); 67 1 So.
2d 525.
252. See, e.g., Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 3 1 0 (La. 1 980) (original
hearing).
253. See id at 3 1 2. The Louisiana Supreme Court eventually held that a seller's
breach of contractual obligations relating to defective products gives rise to tort and
contractual damages. Id at 3 1 9 (rehearing).
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nonpecuniary losses due to the concurrence of tort and contractual
liability in the products liability context. 254 Under current law, recovery
for physical injuries is made solely under the provisions of the
Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA); recovery for economic loss
may only be sought on a contractual theory. 255 No statutory regnne
·

similar to the Louisiana Products Liability Act governs defective
premises, and thus concurrence of tort and contract claims is still
permitted. Therefore, the pre-LPLA jurisprudence permitting recovery

for nonpecuniary losses in contractual actions involving significant
tort aspects, such as personal injuries, could readily be applied to the

lease context by analogy.
The availability of fault-based defenses to the tenant's claim in
contract further muddles the line between contract and tort.

The

Louisiana Civil Code provides for the reduction of the tenant's
recovery in the event that the tenant is injured by a defect that was
known to the tenant but the tenant failed to report to the landlord.256
However, Louisiana courts have long looked beyond the statutory
notice requirement to tort principles to apply comparative fault to a
tenant's claim.257 In so doing, courts have reduced a tenant's recovery
upon a showing that the tenant knew of the defect, that the premises
could have been used safely with the exercise of reasonable care, and
that the tenant failed to use such reasonable care.258 The negligence or
fault of the tenant is not an absolute bar to the tenant's recovery, but
serves to decrease the tenant's recovery proportionally in relation to the
tenant's own fault.259

Since 1984, the Louisiana Civil Code has

specifically provided for the application of comparative negligence in
the contractual realm, through a provision stating, "If the obligee 's
negligence contributes to the obligor's failure to perform, the damages
are reduced in proportion to that negligence."260 More broadly, since

1996, article

2323 of the Civil Code has sanctioned comparative fault

254. Robert E. Landry, Note, Lafleur v. John Deere Co.: No Recovery ofDelictual
Damages for the Sale ofa Useless Produc� 48 LA. L. REV 1 83, 1 98 (1987).
255. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (201 0).
256. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2697 (20 1 0).
257. McGinty v. Pesson, 96-850, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1 2/ 1 1 /96); 685 So . 2d 54 1,
545.
258. Id
259. Wood v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 486 So . 2d 1 129, 1 13 3 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1986). Prior to Louisiana's adoption of comparative fault in 1 979, some Louisiana courts
applied principles of contributory negligence to the tenant's contractual claim against the
landlord. See, e.g, Phillips v. Duplantis, 353 So . 2d 335, 336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1 977), wdt
denied354 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978).
260. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2003.
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for "any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or
loss," providing additional legitimacy to the defective premises
.261
jurisprudence
Finally, the tort and contract aspects of the landlord's
responsibility for the condition of the premises have been conflated in
cases involving contractual waivers of landlord liability. Before
introduction of the tort reform initiatives that relaxed the landlord's tort
liability to a negligence standard, special statutory protections were
22
enacted to protect landlords from strict liability in tort. 6 The relevant
legislation provided that if the tenant contractually assumed responsi
bility for the condition of the premises, the landlord could be held
liable only in the event of negligence.263 Although this legislation was
initially designed to shield landlords from liability in tort, the
Louisiana Supreme Court applied it in an unanticipated manner to
contractual liability as well.264 When the landlord's tort standard of
care was reduced to negligence in the 1 990s, this special legislation
was not repealed, thus preserving it for continued application in the
contractual realm. However, the 2005 revisions to the law of lease
introduced a scheme governing waivers of contractual liability without
repealing or revising the existing legislation. 265 As a result, conflicting

26 1 . Id art. 2323. Some debate exists regarding the proper application of article 2323.
The article appears in Title V of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled "Obligations Arising
Without Agreement." The article's placement would appear to limit its application to the
realm of tort. However, the plain language of the article extends its reach to "any action" for
damages, presumably including contractual actions. The effect of article 2323 in the
redhibition context is currently unsettled. See Aucoin v. S. Quality Homes, LLC, 07-1014,
pp. 10-1 1 & n. 12 (La. 2/26/08); 984 So. 2d 685, 693 & n . 1 2 (declining to resolve the debate).
262. P. Ryan Plummer, Comment, Personal Injury and the Louisiana Law ofLease, 64
LA. L. REv. 1 77, 179-80 (2003).
263. See 1932 La. Acts 1 1 8.
264. SeeTassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1 26 1 , 1263-64 (La. 1 98 1).
265. See LA. CIY. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (h). Comment (h) attempts to address the
competing legislation, stating as follows:
Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev. 2004) deals with the contractual obligations between
the parties rather than with the delictual or quasi-delictual obligations that one
party may incur vis a vis the other party, or vis a vis third parties. Consequently,
Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev. 2004) does not supersede the provisions of R.S.
9:3221 which provides for delictual or quasi-delictual obligations incurred as a
result of injury occurring in the leased premises.

Id However, the accuracy of this comment is highly questionable. R.S. 9:3221 is broadly
worded, referencing "iajury caused by any defect," so that it appears to encompass both
contract and tort liability. LA. REv. STAT. ANN . § 9:322 1 (201 0). Relying on this broad
language, the Louisiana Supreme Court has applied RS. 9:3221 to the contractual setting.
See Tassin, 396 So. 2d at 1 264. Moreover, when article 2699 was introduced in 2005, the
language "Notwithstanding the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code 2699" was added to R.S.

20 10]
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legislation now prohibits such waivers in cases involving physical

injury or defects that "seriously affect health or safety," and yet
simultaneously protects landlords under such waivers so long as they
do not act negligently.

266

In summary, Louisiana's contractual approach to landlord liability
for defective premises stands out as unique among the jurisdictions
studied here. The contractual approach is at once both different from
the tort model and yet infiltrated by tort concepts. In cases involving
the recovery of personal injury damages, under both theories of
recovery, the definition of actionable "defects" is identical, principles
of comparative fault apply, and nonpecuniary losses are compensable.
However, because the standard of liability and prescriptive period are
so much more favorable to the tenant in contract than in tort, it cannot
be said that in Louisiana the two theories are entirely converging. On
the other hand, the disparity between the theories has been strongly
tempered by the expansion of the contractual protections to include
tenants' family members and roommates under the protection of
contract.

IV. RECASTING AS CONTORT
Parts II and ill of this Article traced the

common law's

"bifurcated" approach to landlord liability for defective premises and
explored the "concurrent" approaches employed
Scotland, and Louisiana.

in South Africa,

This Part now examines the comparative

lessons that can be derived from the similarities and differences
observed.

First, although the common law and civil law regimes

studied here employ different frameworks for assessing landlord

In the jurisdictions
studied here, a tort-based action is available both to tenants and

liability, the approaches are highly consistent.

tenants' family members and guests who are injured by a landlord's
negligence in failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition. And,

in the jurisdictions studied here, a contract-based action is available to
tenants who wish to repudiate their lease and demand a reduction in
their rent, reimbursement for repairs, or other economic relief. Thus,
although the gap separating

caveat lessee from dual liability in contract

and in tort was once wide, the common law's recent reformation of
landlord-tenant law has done much to bridge the chasm.

9:3221 , thus evidencing an intent for the revised statute to maintain undisturbed despite the
addition ofnew waiver requirements in the civil code. 2004 La. Acts. 82 l .
266. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2699; cf LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 9:3221 (2010).
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Second, the extension of the contract-based action to
consequential losses has been problematic in all jurisdictions. In the
United States, the desire to maintain the separation between contract
and tort has resulted in an artificial "lopping off" of all consequential
damages in contract. And yet, the concurrent approach espoused by
the civil law suffers from its own disadvantages. Specifically,
contractual privity, coupled with the distinctions between the t wo
theories of recovery, produces inequities between tenants, who are
signatories to the lease, and nontenants, who are not parties to the
contract. Additionally, categorical rules governing the role of fault in
contract exacerbate the disparity between the two causes of action.
Finally, the availability of nonpecuniary damages is complicated by the
often strict rules governing awards of such damages in contract.
These observations lead to the conclusion that landlord liability
for defective premises is best characterized as a hybrid liability
consisting of elements of both contract and tort. Recognizing the
inherently mixed nature of landlord liability for defective premises,
and recasting the landlord's obligation as contort, would eliminate
many injustices currently inherent in both the common law 's bifurcated
approach and the civilian approach of concurrence. Moreover, a
conceptually clearer cause of action would emerge.

A.

The Notion ofContort

Although the distinction between contract and tort may seem
elementary at first blush, it has been observed that "[t]he
determination of the borderline between contract and delict is among
the most difficult of legal problems."261 Many celebrated works
treating tort law at the macro level have explored, as an initial question,
the line of demarcation between the two types of liability.268 Numerous
grounds for distinction have been advanced-some superficial, others
less so. At the most basic level, contract and tort differ in that contract
involves the act of human will to be bound by certain legal
consequences, whereas tort imposes legal consequences regardless of
an actor's will to be bound in such a manner.269 A correlate of this
267. Daniel N. Mettarlin, Contractual and Delictual Responsibility in Quebec: The
Rediscovery ofContract, 8 McGILL L.J. 38, 38 (1961).
268. See, e.g., KEE10N ET AL., supra note 27, § 92; McKERRON, supra note 1 29, § 2-5;
Andre Tune, Introduction to 1 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1 9-29
(Andre Tune ed., 1 983).
269. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 3; WT. Tete,
Obligations Revision, 32 LOY. L. REv. 47, 54 (1986).

T
ort Roots and Ramifications

ofthe
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precept is the closely related notion that obligations in tort are owed by
an actor to the world at large, whereas contractual obligations are
generally owed only to those in whose favor they have been voluntarily
0
assumed.21
The distinction between contract and tort blurs, however, when an
actor breaches a voluntarily asswned contractual duty that is identical
or closely related to one otherwise owed to the world at large
11
regardless of the existence of contract. 2
These difficult cases arise
with such frequency that modem scholars have coined new terms,
including the term "contort," to describe the phenomena.212

The

terminology may be academic, but the consequences are not.273 The
distinction between obligations arising from tort and those arising from
contract are numerous, and significant.

Characterizing a claim as

arising from either tort or contract can affect the standard of liability,
available defenses, and the type and scope of available damages,
among many other important substantive and procedural consequences
of classification.214 In cases involving contorts, a party often vies for
the classification whose attributes most strongly favor his case, or may

270. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 2 1 . There are, of course, limited exceptions to
this rule. For example, in both civil and common law jurisdictions, contractual obligations
can be assumed for the benefit of third parties, in the form of a third-party beneficiary
contract or stipulation pour autmi. See ZWEIGER T & KbTZ, supra note 9, at 145-50
(referencing BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 328(1) and Code civil [C.
crv.] art. 1 1 2 1 (Fr.)); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37: 1 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing doctrine of
third-party beneficiaries in the United States); ROBERT MERKIN, PRIVITY OF CONTR ACT,
Preface (2000) (addressing the effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on
the doctrine of privity in England).
271. Indeed, scholars ofthe civil and common law tradition alike have long studied the
boundary between contract and tort in these difficult cases, with the overwhelming
conclusion that the lines of division are illusory, arbitrary, and largely unsatisfactory. See
generally WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED
TO PICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1 954).
272. GILMO RE, supra note 14, at 95-98; Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 43. Another term,
"uncontract," has been coined to describe contractual liability that arises in the absence of
express agreement. Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational
Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 1 39-41 (1988). The landlord's contractual liability
for defective premises can, in the usual case, be considered uncontractual in nature, given that
the obligation is implied, rather than expressly negotiated.
273. PROSSER, supra note 27 1 , at 422.
274. See Galligan, supra note 98, at 476-8 1 . In addition to the differing consequences
discussed here, others include the capacity or discernment required to obligate oneself, the
potential for vicarious liability, the availability of specific performance, applicable burdens of
proof, and such procedural issues as jurisdiction and venue. See KEETON ET A L., supra note
27, at 665-76; Tony Weir Complex Liabilities, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
268, ch. 1 2, at 1 1 -45; Galligan, supra note 98, at 476-8 1 ; Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 7-16;
Tune, supra note 268, at 27.
,
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even seek a combination o f attributes by arguing that he should be
permitted to sue under both theories.
The problem of whether a litigant should be able to cumulate
theories of recovery and thus gain the "best of both worlds" is
addressed differently across jurisdictional lines.275
example, the doctrine of

non-cumul operates

In France, for

to require a litigant to

bring his claim in contract where a contractual theory of recovery
16
exists, thus barring any claim in tort. 2
In the United States, the
approach is less clear.

Generally, courts permit litigants to "elect"

remedies when an issue of procedural law is at stake. 277 Even when
substantive law is at stake, but the claim involves damages to property
or pecuniary interests, litigants are generally permitted to choose the
theory of recovery.218 However, claims involving personal injury are,
by and large, relegated to tort,219 while claims involving pure economic
20
loss are generally relegated to contract. 8
Each of the various approaches to cumulation has its own
limitations and pitfalls, in response to which some wider-ranging
21
solutions have been advanced. 8 One proposed solution to the problem
of contort is a complete merger or unification of tort and contractual
liability.282 The historical dichotomy of contract versus tort has come to
be viewed in some ways as an outdated, formalistic means of
understanding law.283 Also, because the distinctions between contract
and tort often vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in an apparently
arbitrary manner, it is difficult to justify the continuous maintenance of
separate categories.284 This apparently extreme approach has not been
well-received, primarily because of the recognition that contract and
tort remain :fundamentally different in some

important respects,

particularly with regard to the values that each realm seeks to
advance.285

Whereas contract law seeks primarily to foster private

275. For a comprehensive review of approaches taken by numerous jurisdictions in
both the common law and civil law traditions, see Loubser, supra note 1 70.
276. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 19-20.
277. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 666.
278. Id
279. Id at 666-67.
280. Loubser, supra note 1 70, at 1 1 9.
2 8 1 . See id at 1 23-25.
282. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 48; Tune, supra note 268, at 27.
283. See Weir, supra note 274, ch. 1 2 at4-5.
284. See id; Olivier Moreteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract and Tort:
The Role ofEstoppel and Reliance in Mapping Out the Law of Obligations, in TORT AND
INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, at 67 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C.
Steininger eds., 2005).
285. See Tune, supra note 268, at 27-28.
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economic relationships and to protect the economic expectations of
contracting parties, tort law seeks primarily to prevent individuals from
causing injury to others and to compensate victims of unlawful
86
harm. 2
A less radical approach than the total merger of contract and tort
is the unification of the legal regimes that govern their litigation. This
approach is favored by scholars who recognize the theoretical
distinction between the categories of contract and tort, but still
advocate a merging of the rules governing the two theories in order to
prevent the anomalous, inefficient, and sometimes unjust outcomes
observed in claims involving contorts. 287 Several jurisdictions have
attempted to close entirely the divide between contract and tort.
Czechoslovakia, for example, adopted a uniform regime for tortious
and contractual liability in 1950.288 Also in Senegal, contract and tort
2
are treated under a common scheme. 89 Most recently, France has
begun the process of reforming its law of obligations with an eye
toward unifying
20
liability. 9

treatment

of contractual and

extra-contractual

In a more limited fashion, the Civil Code of Quebec provides that

the same types and extent of damages are recoverable whether liability
lies in contract or in tort.291 Additionally, numerous jurisdictions today
provide for uniform periods of limitation governing claims in contract
and tort.292 A recent example of such unification hails from France,
where 2008 reforms unified prescriptive periods for contractual and
extra-contractual liability.293 Under the revisions, a general five-year
prescriptive period applies to all personal actions, whether based in
contract or in tort, while a ten-year period applies to all actions in
286. Loubser, supra note 170, at 1 1 4-1 8; see also Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond PromjssoryEstoppel- Contract Lawandthe "Invis1ble Handshake, "52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 903, 905 (1985) (describing the function of the doctrine of consideration).
287. See KEETON ET AL., supm note 27, at 655; Litvinoff, supm note 14, at 48;
Loubser, supra note 1 70, at 1 14-18.
288. SeeTunc, supra note 268, at 12-14, 29.
289. See id. at 29.
290. Olivier Moreteau, France, m TORT AND INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN
TORT LAW 2005, at 270, 271 (Hehnut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2006).
291 . Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1457, 1458, 2922 (Can.).
292. See Janke, supra note 235, at 657-64 (detailing the uniform prescriptive periods
of the Republic of Seychelles, the Czech Republic, Quebec, Iraq, Kazakhstan, the
Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, South Africa, and Switzerland, among other jurisdictions).
293. Loi 2008-561 du 17 juin 2008 portant reforme de la prescription en matiere civile
[Law no. 2009-561 of 1 7 Jwie 2008, Reforming Civil Prescription], Recueil Dalloz
(D.)
2008, 2512; Olivier Moreteau, France, m TORT AND INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN
TORT LAW 2008, at 264 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger
eds., 2009).
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compensation of bodily injury, again regardless of the source of
liability.294 France's act of abandoning all distinctions between contract
and tort in the context of prescription has been heralded as a "step
towards European harmonization."295
The sweeping approach of unification is the exception rather than
the rule, however. More commonly, contorts are addressed on a case
by-case basis. Either legislation or jurisprudence will create a scheme
for a specific problem in contort to downplay the friction resulting
from its location at the seam of these two separate spheres of the law.296
For example, in the realm of legal malpractice, where the claim of an
aggrieved client is tied both to the contractual relationship of the
parties and the attorney's failure to exercise due care, American courts
have adopted uniform rules that do not

depend on

doctrinal

classification to govern problematic issues such as the appropriate
statute of limitations and the timing of accrual. 297

Following this

national trend, Louisiana has adopted a statutory prescriptive period
for legal malpractice actions that is entirely divorced from the general
limitations periods applicable to tort and contract claims.298 A similar
unified scheme has been adopted for medical malpractice actions.299 In
some jurisdictions products liability is similarly treated in order to
reduce the friction between contract and tort.300

The distinction

between contract and tort is also frequently set aside in harmonization
efforts, such as the European directive of 1985 on product liability,

which provides solutions in general terms and avoids references to
contract or tort. 301 Such ad hoc unification o f the regimes applicable to
294. CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] arts. 2224, 2226 (Fr.).
295. Moreteau, supm note 293, at 266.
296. See Tom Hadden, Contract, Tort and Cnme: The Forms ofLegal Thought, 87 L.
Q. R.Ev. 240, 269-70 (197 1 ); Tune, supra note 268, at 22, 25-29. Sometimes, the particular
scheme that is fashioned consists of a blend of contract and tort principles; in other cases, the

See Galligan, supm note 98,
502. Thus, for example, in England and the United States, medical malpractice is often

chosen scheme reflects a preference for one regime over another.
at

treated as tort even though the patient and the doctor may enjoy a contractual relationship.

Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
287, 287 (1986).
297. See Jonathan M. Albano, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contract and
Tort in Legal MalpmcticeActions, 22 B.C. L. REv. 545 ( 198 1 ).
298. LA . REv. STAT. ANN . § 9:5605 (20 1 0); see Galligan, supm note 98, at 477-78
(noting that accounting malpractice is treated similarly in Louisiana).
299. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628; see Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 34-35 (noting that
See PS. Atiyah,

PROBS.

the shortened prescriptive period (one to three years) is consistent with contract, but statutory
caps are consistent with contract).
300. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 9:2800.5 1

to - 1 8 (Fr.).

3 0 1 . Moreteau, supm note 284, at 67.

to

.60; CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] arts. 1 386-1
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individual contorts may be the most direct, efficient, and politically
viable solution to the overlap of contract and tort. As is the case for
legal malpractice, medical malpractice, and products liability, the term
"contort" properly characterizes landlord liability for defective

premises due to its placement at the intersection of contract and tort.
An expedient remedy for the difficulties inherent in the landlord's dual
and overlapping obligations, then, is unification of the two disparate
regimes.
B.

LandlordLiability as Contort
In many ways, contract is a poor home for the landlord's liability

for defective premises, even where tenants seek traditional contractual
relief, such as damages for economic loss in the form of rent
abatement and reimbursement for repairs.302

The contract model is

even less appropriate when a landlord's breach of the obligation of
habitability results in personal injury
tenant.3°3

or

property damage to the

The regulatory nature of this implied, often mandatory

obligation gives it a tort-like character, as does its tie to the tenant's
physical comfort and safety.
Whenever the law implies contractual obligations in a regulatory
manner to protect one party from the abuses of another regardless of,
or even in spite of, the implied will of the parties, the line between
contract and tort blurs.304 This is the case with the residential landlord's
obligation to maintain the premises.

Although the parties intend to

voluntarily bind themselves to the contract of lease, it cannot be
credibly asserted that the implied warranty of habitability parallels the
subjective intention of the landlord.

Rather, the law implies the

warranty of habitability in order to regulate the landlord's behavior
not in order to fulfill the parties' subjective intent. This is particularly
true in the United States, where the implied warranty of habitability
302.

See Smith, supra note 38, at 5 1 6- 1 8 ("The warranty concept might legitimately

have been applied to latent defects in existence when the lease was entered into (or possession
transferred), but could not apply to a duty to maintain the premises arising thereafter. The
tenn ' warranty' signifies a person's representation of a state of facts that exist at the time the
representation is made, and clearly is not synonymous with a promise that a person will do
something in the future . . . . )
"

303.

.

Indeed, in the United States, when cases involving personal injuries and property

damage resulting from breaches of the warranty of habitability began winding their way
through the courts, several commentators remarked on the difficulties involved and proposed
solutions. See, e.g., Browder, supra note 25, at 99; Michael J. Davis & Phillip E. DeLaTorre,
A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by Uze Wammty ofHabitability, 59 WASH. L.
REv. 141 ( 1 984); Love, supra note 1 8, at 1 1 2-58.
304. See Ttulc supra note 268, at 25.
,
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implemented as

a device to protect residential
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tenants

consumers with little bargaining power who are perceived to be in
need of and deserving of protection.305 The fact that the warranty does
not validate an implied understanding between landlords and tenants,
but mandates minimum housing standards as a form of consumer
protection, smacks not of contract, but of tort.
The existence of an implied contractual term is, of course, not
enough to push the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises from
the contractual realm completely into the realm of tort. Implied terms,
or

suppletive

terms, as they are known in the civil law, abound in the

realm of contract.

Nor is the protective nature of the warranty of

habitability and its civil law cousins determinative.

The very terms

"warranty" and "guaranty," which are frequently employed in strictly
contractual relations, derive from a term that means "protection" (the

gewiihren).306

German

But the landlord's obligation to maintain the

premises has evolved into more than a mere suppletive term of
contract.

The law heavily restricts the parties' ability to waive the

implied obligations of the landlord relating to the condition of the
premises in Louisiana, Scotland, and the common law jurisdictions of
the United States.

These restrictions on contractual waivers serve a

regulatory function in that they are predicated on the beliefthat tenants
lack sufficient bargaining power to protect themselves contractually
and thus ought to be protected by the state. 307

In South Africa, the

constitutional right to adequate housing serves a similar :function.308
The hybrid nature of landlord liability for defective premises does
not stem only from the fact that the contractual obligation has its
source in tort-like consumer protection regulation. Landlord liability

305.

In fact, the implied warranty of habitability was first imported into American law

specifically to create a right in the tenant to withhold rent or to avoid the lease completely in
the event the housing was shown to be substandard.

See Smith, supra note

38,

at

506.

As

discussed above in Part II, infra, these remedies were not available under the common law, as
a direct result of the doctrine of independent covenants, even when the landlord specifically
assumed a contractual obligation to maintain the premises in good repair.

306. Barry Nicholas, Rules and Terms-Civil Law and Common Law, 48 Tm,. L. REv:
946, 950 ( 1974).
307. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., & John C. LaMaster, The Implied Wammty of
Habitability: Louisiana Institution, Common Law Innovation, 46 LA. L. REv. 1 95, 2 14- 1 5
( 1 985).
308. The South African Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights has
noted:

"Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the inhabitants with

adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to
health, structural hazards, and disease vectors.
guaranteed as well."
marks omitted).

M
pange

v.

Sithole

The physical safety of occupants must be

2007 (6)

SA

578 (W)

at

593

(internal quotation
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for the condition of the premises retains firm footing in contract law.
The residential lease-both at civil and common law-is an ongoing,
bilateral contract in which rent is exchanged in return for not merely
possession of the premises, but also assurance that the premises will
remain safe and livable.
landlord's

responsibility

The inherently contractual nature of the
is

underscored by

the

United

States'

Adoption of a contract model

experience with its initial adoption.

permitted American courts to construe the obligations of the landlord
and the tenant as mutually dependent, which provided a mechanism by
which an aggrieved tenant could either repudiate the lease, suspend
payment of rent, or demand specific performance.309 These traditional
contract remedies were viewed as indispensable to achieve the socially
desirable goal of tenant protection and safety.Jl0
In addition, the tort obligations of landlords in all of the studied

jurisdictions indirectly tie back to this contractual responsibility.

In

both the civil law and the common law, tort liability for defective
premises is predicated upon control-the ability to take action to
prevent unreasonable risks of harm.311

In the lease context, the

landlord's contractual duty relating to the condition of the premises
maintains the requisite control to justify imposition of tort liability. In
the United States particularly, widespread recognition of the implied
warranty of habitability caused tort immunities for landlords to give
way entirely to a new requirement of reasonable care.312 Thus, the very
existence of the contractual obligation, which provides the requisite
control, gives rise to the obligation in tort.
C

Benefits ofRecasting as Contort
Recasting landlord liability for defective premises as a single,

hybrid liability in contort touches upon every aspect of an injured
party's claim, from the initial question of who can sue, to the
determination of the existence and extent of the landlord's liability, to
the ultimate determination of damages. This Part explores the impact
that recasting would have on premises liability law in the American
common law as well as in civilian jurisdictions.

309. See Javins v. First Nat'! Realty Corp . 428 F.2d 107 1 , 1 082 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Smith, supra. note 38, at 505-34.
3 1 0 . See Smith, supra. not.e 3 8, at 5 1 5.
3 1 1 . See discussion supra. Parts II.A., III.A.
3 1 2. See Davis & DeLaTorre, supra. note 303, at 1 54-60. The
element of"control" has
become a factor in the question of whether the landlord has exercised reasonab
le care. Id at
157 .
,
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Breaking the Confines of Privity
The most cogent ground for recasting landlord liability for

defective premises as contort is the fact that continued demarcation
between contract and tort theories of liability results in disparate
treatment for tenants, who are signatories to the lease and protected by
contract, and nontenants, who are nonsignatories to the lease and thus
protected only in tort. Lawmakers in jurisdictions where separate tort
and contract remedies lie should consider whether it makes sense to
provide varying levels of protection to the tenant, family members, and
guests.

In many contexts, providing a signatory to a contract with greater
protection than that afforded to the world at large is justified.313
Contracting parties voluntarily subject themselves to obligations that,
although similar to obligations owed to the general public, are
unique.314 In the context of residential lease, however, the imposition
of different schemes of liability in contract versus tort becomes
difficult to defend. The landlord, aware that the premises are let for the
purpose of a dwelling, expects the premises to be occupied by not only
the tenant but also the tenant's family and occasionally even guests.315

In some circumstances, the landlord may even derive economic benefit
from the tenant's family members. In dual-earner households, a
nonsignatory commonly contributes to the payment of rent. There is
little justification, then, for the provision of unique contract-based
remedies for personal injury to a signatory tenant. The human element
underscores the lack of theoretical legitimacy. That is, in many cases
an untenantable condition can pose a

greater risk

to a tenant's family

members, especially small children, than to the adult signatory.316
Recognizing landlord liability for defective premises as a hybrid
liability allows for extension of the same, single cause of action to all
parties.

The civilian experience illustrates that mere recognition of

concWTent liability in contract (for signatories) and tort (for all injured
parties) does not go far enough to alleviate disparity in classes of
plaintiffs.

Although the signatory's tort suit is identical to the one

available to third parties, the tenant enjoys a unique contractual claim

3 13 . See Litvinoff, supra note 1 4 , at 8 .
3 14. See id
3 1 5 . PALMER, supra note 122, § 3 - 1 7.
3 1 6. This is certainly the case in Scotland, where children often suffer from asthma as
a result of damp conditions in the leased premises. See supra text accompanying notes 2082 1 0.
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that is unavailable to others.317 Recasting landlord liability for defective
premises as contort provides a sound theoretical basis for reducing
disparity between the claims of tenants and third parties.

Thus far,

only Louisiana has taken a step to close the divide, by relaxing the
requirement of privity in an ad hoc fashion to provide a contractual
theory of recovery to all persons who "reside in the premises in
accordance with the lease," be they family members or roommates.318

2.

Increasing the Role of Fault in Determinations of Liability
Recognizing that the landlord's obligation for the condition of the

premises lies in both contract and tort also has the distinct advantage
of freeing landlord liability for defective premises from what are
essentially arbitrary rules governing "fault" in contract.

The role of

fault in contract law is a subject of heated debate both in common law
and civilian jurisdictions, though the issues presented vary from one
tradition to the other.319 Ultimately, the international trend is one of
wider recognition of the role of contractual fault of both contractual
obligors (here landlords) and obligees (here tenants).

Recasting as

contort places landlord liability for defective premises squarely ahead
of this trend.
In the common law, a perceived categorical rule of contract is
liability without fault.320 The notion that contractual liability must be
strict liability is largely a common law phenomenon; indeed, in many
civilian and mixed jurisdictions, the notion of fault pervades the realm
of contract.321 In the civil law, a distinction i s drawn between a contract
of means (in France,

3 1 7.

obligation

de moyens) and a contract of result

This is the current scenario in the American product liability law context, in

which a buyer injured by a defective product may bring either a strict liability tort cause of
action in addition to or in lieu of a contractual breach of warranty claim. See l DAVID G.

0wEN ET AL., MADDEN & OwEN ONPRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 . 1 (3d ed. 2000).
3 1 8.

LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2698 (201 0).

3 1 9. See Stefan Grundmann, The Fault Principle as the Chameleon ofContract Law:
A Market Function Approach, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1 583, 1 5 86-92 (2009); Posner, supra note
98, at 143 1 .
320.

See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 98, at 1 34 1 ; Galligan, supra note 98, at 463;

Kreitner, supra note 98, at 1 5 3 3-35; Posner, supra note 98, at 1436.
32 1 . Richard A Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 1 07 MICH. L. REV.
1 349, 1 35 1 & n.8 (2009); WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., TORT LAW 3 3 (2000) ("It was also
held, among other controversial distinctions, that contractual duties guarantee a particular
outcome, while duties in tort only bind one to take reasonable care . . . . Nowadays it is well
established in all legal systems that contracts also lead frequently to duties to take care--0ften
implied, whereas in the area of tort law liability not based on conduct-and generally
triggered by the occurrence of a given event-becomes increasingly frequent.").
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In the former, a party is liable only if he is

shown to be at fault; whereas in the latter, a party is strictly liable for
his failure to achieve a required result.323

In the common law,

contractual "warranties" are generally thought of as akin to contracts
of result, and thus strict in nature.

As seen above, in the mixed

jurisdictions, it appears as though the obligation to maintain the
premises may be viewed

as

either an obligation of means or one of

result.
Analysis of the American approach to landlord liability reveals
that attitudes about the role of fault in contract law drove the
preference for a tort model of premises liability. As discussed above, a
contingent ofAmerican courts and commentators favored a negligence
standard over a strict liability standard for landlords, and thus, the tort
model seemed to be the only fit.324 A historical review of the "rule" of
strict liability in contract reveals the fundamental flaw of this approach.
When, in the late nineteenth century, contract law became centered
around freedom of will, the rule of strict liability came to embody the
notion that contracting parties are free to impose absolute obligations
on one another.325 Thus, the very theory that contractual obligations
arise solely from will drove the imposition of strict liability in
contract.326 Insofar

as

landlord liability for defective premises involves

nonwaivable obligations imposed by law, it falls outside of the
historical rationale for imposing strict contractual liability.
Recasting as contort will allow jurisdictions to determine the
appropriate standard of liability as a matter of policy as opposed to a
matter of classification.

It is not the aim of this Article to express a

preference for a fault-based standard of liability over a strict liability
standard, or to suggest that comparative analysis necessarily reveals the
superiority of a particular approach. Rather, the responsibility that a
particular jurisdiction chooses to impose upon residential landlords
should reflect local concerns regarding housing and human rights
issues which, as noted in the Introduction above, appear to have long
foreclosed comparative research in the arena of property law.327 These
issues are inherently tied to local culture, ''the one feature of a legal
system that cannot be borrowed, transplanted, or received."328
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
3 2 7.
328.

306, at 952.
Id
See discussion supra Part H.B.
Kreitner, supra note 98, at 1 535-36.
Id
See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
Palmer, supra note 1 34, at 537.
Nicholas, supra note

More
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salient from a comparative view would be the failure

of any

jurisdiction to reanalyze the propriety of a standard of care that may
have been utilized for hundreds of years in light of contemporary
housing concerns. Unlike American jurisdictions, which have recently
engaged in a comprehensive policy debate regarding the appropriate
standard of care for landlords, the mixed jurisdictions studied here
appear not to have reassessed the social propriety of the chosen
standard of liability in a meaningful way in recent years.
Even those jurisdictions that recognize the role of fault in the
landlord's obligation to maintain the premises struggle with the
question of how comparative fault principles may reduce the claim of
an aggrieved party.

Among the jurisdictions studied here, only

Louisiana broadly authorizes the use of comparative fault principles in
contractual claims. 329 Other jurisdictions have yet to apply comparative
fault to the contractual realm, although this has recently been an issue
Some agreement appears to be

of much interest and debate.330

emerging that even if the use of comparative fault is not appropriate in
all contractual claims, its use is appropriate when the contractual claim
concurs with a similar or identical claim in tort.331 Moreover, the use of
comparative fault may be particularly relevant where, as here, the
contractual obligations of the parties are imposed by law rather than
freely bargained. The use of comparative fault has been described as
"unpersuasive in so far as it tends to undermine the contractual
allocation of risks between the parties."332 But where parties have not
freely allocated those risks, the defense of comparative fault should be
available to a contracting party.
generalized

contractual

One commentator has argued that a

defense

of

comparative

fault

would

"encourage cooperation, solidarity and caution" between parties to a
329. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2003 (2010); LITVINOFF, supm note 1 32, § 5.35.
330. See SA Law Commission, supm note 1 69, § 4.122; Ariel Porat, A Comparative
Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1 397 (2009); Fabrizio Cafaggi, Creditor's
Fault: In Search ofa Comparative Frame, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Omri Ben
Shahar & Ariel Porat eds. 2010).
33 1 . See SA Law Commission, supra note 169, § 4.1 12; Porat, supra note 330 (citing
LAW COMM'N, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENCE IN CONTRACT para. 1 .4 (1993)
("Over the years, the CFD [comparative fault defense] has spread into the contract law of
many countries (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel), albeit primarily in cases
where a party breached a contractual duty of reasonable cave as in cases of concurrent tort or
contract liability.")). Some American Courts have shown a willingness to apply comparative
fault principles to cases involving breach of implied contractual warranties. Id at 1 397 n.4.
Also, under the American Uniform Comparative Fault Act, "fault" is broadly construed to
include breach of warranty, which straddles the line between contract and tort. UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 & cmt., 12 UL.A. 125 (1 977).
332. See SA Law Commission, supm note 169, § 4.1 17.
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contract.333 Furthermore, such a defense would incentivize compliance
with contractual obligations as well as the mitigation of damages
resulting from breach. 334 Incentivizing the cooperation of contracting
parties is of paramount importance where, as in a contract for
residential lease, the parties enter into an ongoing and continuous
relationship rather than a one-shot deal.
The application of comparative fault principles to contractual
claims may take place slowly and, in some jurisdictions, on a very
limited basis. And yet, comparative fault principles could be applied
to claims involving landlord liability for defective premises on an ad
hoc basis regardless

of the speed at which the trend toward

comparative fault in contract evolves in a given jurisdiction. Recasting
as contort provides the necessary freedom for such ad hoc treatment,
which is desirable given the relative agreement on the utility of
comparative fault for claims located at the contract-tort divide.
In those jurisdictions employing a contract model, the landlord's
defense of assumption of the risk can completely bar the plaintiff's
claim.

As indicated in the foregoing discussion of South Africa,

Scotland, and Louisiana, the assumption of the risk defense rarely
succeeds because landlords usually cannot show that a tenant clearly
assented to the risk of harm.

Even if such proof were available, an

assumption of the risk defense does not make sense in the context of

the landlord-tenant relationship.

A relative disparity in bargaining

power exists between residential landlord and tenant-a disparity that
is recognized both by the implied nature of the obligation to repair and
the nonwaivability of that obligation.

Does a tenant ever have the

requisite bargaining power to "assume" the risk freely by taking the
premises subject to the existence of a defect?335 One Scottish tribunal
observed that the assumption of the risk defense is predicated on the
view that the tenant who discovers a dangerous defect should
"repudiate the lease and go to live elsewhere."336 This rationale loses
force in light of the fact that superior housing may be nonexistent,
scarce, or otherwise unattainable. The more appropriate measure of a
tenant's fault is not an alleged assumption of risk, but instead the

333. Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: Toward a Pnncipled
Approach, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 1 4 1 , 169 (1 994).
334. Id
335. See Palmer, supra note 49, at 25.
336. See Hughes' Tutrix v. Glasgow Dist. Council, ( 1 982) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 70, 72
(Scot.).
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tenant's comparative negligence in failing to identify or avoid an
unsafe defect in the leased premises.

3.

Removing Artificial Obstacles to Remedies
Finally, recasting the landlord's liability for the condition of the

premises

as

contort provides injured parties with a full range of

damages incurred, without concern for the theory of liability pled or
proven.

Currently, categorical rules governing damages awards in

contract stand in the way of a tenant's recovery for personal injury
damages

as

well

as

other consequential losses, such as those for

personal property damage and "pure" nonpecuniary loss.

Given that

the landlord's obligation with respect to the premises is described in all
jurisdictions in terms of physical safety, not only physical injuries but
also mental pain and suffering attributable to threats to health and
safety are well within the contemplation of the parties. Classification
of a plaintiff's cause of action as falling within the ambit of contract
rather than tort should not hinder such awards.
The distinction between contract and tort with regard to damages
is often highlighted in the realm of nonpecuniary loss.337 As a general
rule in all jurisdictions studied here, a plaintiff may not recover
nonpecuniary losses resulting from breach of contract.338 Because
contract law focuses primarily on protecting the economic concerns of
the contracting parties, it follows that the protection provided by the
law should be limited to economic or financial losses.339 A number of
jurisdictions recognize exceptions to this general rule, and a growing
international trend favors recognition of nonpecuniary losses wherever
10
they occur. 4
This is the approach espoused by the Principles of
European Contract Law341 and utilized in France342 and Quebec.343
Many jurisdictions have not gone so far, however, in liberating their
approach to nonpecuniary loss as a general matter.

3 3 7.

Galligan, sup.ra note 98, at 466-7 1 .

338.

See WILLISTON, supra note 97, § 64:7.

339.
340.

Clive & Hutchison, supra note 199, at 1 84.
Id

34 1 .

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 9:501 (2)(a) (Ole Lando & Hugh

Beale eds., 2000).
342.

Suzanne Galand-Carval, France:

Non-Pecuniary Loss Under French Law, in

DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 87, 1 00
Rogers ed., 2001); Palmer, supra note 200, at 2 1 3 - 1 4.
343 .

Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 199 1 , c. 64, art. 1 458

(Can.) ("[H]e is

(WV.

Horton

liable for any

bodily, moral or material injury he causes to the other contracting party."); Palmer, supra note
200, at 2 1 3-14.
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In South Africa the rule against nonpecuniary damages for
breach of contract remains strict and gives way to few exceptions.344
Thus tenants may not recover contractual damages for physical pain
and suffering.345 Additionally, in the United States, tenant claims for
personal injuries have been entirely relegated to tort.346

This result

seems especially bizarre in the United States, where the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts provides an explicit exception for breaches of
contract involving bodily harm.347 The question also arises whether it
is sensible to restrict the landlord's obligation to the tort realm,
effectively stripping it of its place in contract, merely because a
plaintiff pursues nonpecuniary damages. In both South Africa and the
United States, this approach has resulted in unintended consequences.

In South Africa, the tenant's inability to recover nonpecuniary losses in
contract deprives the contractual cause of action of much of its utility,
with the result that most tenant claims are brought in tort rather than
on the contract.348 In the United States, several jurisdictions have gone
too far by entirely foreclosing the possibility of recovery of any
consequential losses in contract.349

Also, the relegation of personal

injury claims to tort by American jurisdictions has resulted in the
anomalous phenomenon that vengeful landlords may evict tenants who
have filed personal

injury

lawsuits, but not tenants who have filed

claims for repairs or rent abatement.350

In contrast to South Africa, in Louisiana and Scotland, damages
for emotional distress are awarded for breach of the landlord's
contractual obligation
nonpecuniary losses.

as

an exception to the general rule against

Scotland has jurisprudentially allowed recovery

of general damages for pain and suffering related to personal injury in
contracts involving sales of defective goods as well as leases of
defective premises, though in neither case has the rationale for this
exception been fully explored. Recognizing the hybrid nature of the

344.

Palmer, supm note 200, at 2 1 3.

345.

See discussion supm Part III.B. I .

346.

See discussion supm Part H.B.

347.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 ( 1 982) (''Recovery for emotional

disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.").
This rule has been adopted in most U.S. jurisdictions. See WILLISTON, supm note 97, § 64:7
& n.2 1 . Note, however, that the original Restatement's formulation of the rule required not
only bodily injury but also "wanton or reckless breach."
CON TRACTS § 341 ( 1 932).
348. See discussion supra Part III.A

349.

See discussion supra Part 11.B.

350.

See discussion supra Part H.B.
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landlord's obligation for the condition of the premises provides a
wanting theoretical justification for the exception. In Louisiana, where
nonpecuniary damages for mental suffering are authorized by the Civil
Code, and where "pure" emotional distress damages

are

awarded in

appropriate cases, courts appear reluctant to award pain and suffering
damages on a contract theory. At one time in Louisiana's legal history
the tenant's actions against the landlord in tort and contract were very
similar, making irrelevant a specific award of nonpecuniary damages
on the contract as opposed to in tort.

Now that tort reforms have

reduced the standard of care in tort to negligence, it is clear that tenants
are more protected by strict liability in contract, and therefore awards
of pain and suffering damages under a contract theory are more
valuable. Recasting landlord liability for defective premises as contort
could assist to reverse the jurisprudential trend against contractual
awards for personal injury losses.
Moreover, nonpecuniary awards for breach of the landlord's
repair obligation are not only conceptually attractive, they are socially
desirable.

Nonpecuniary damages, particularly those awarded for

emotional distress and inconvenience in the absence of physical injury,
can serve a vital deterrent function closely linked to the social policy
of tenant protection by providing the landlord with an economic
incentive for keeping the premises in good repair.351 If nonpecuniary
losses are generally awarded only when a tenant is physically injured,
the deterrent function is lost for those defects that pose a serious risk to
human health and safety, but that by luck or chance do not in fact
physically injure the tenant, the tenant's family, or guests.

V.

CONCLUSION
This Article has had a dual aim: to contribute to the comparative

examination of tenancy law in a modest fashion, and i n so doing, to
provide a critical appraisal of the American approach to landlord
liability for defective premises.

The very adoption of the implied

warranty of habitability in the common law represents a closing of the
once vast gulf between the civil law and common law approaches to
residential tenancy.352 Moreover, comparative analysis reveals that the
United States has not been alone in its struggle to characterize landlord
liability as contract- or tort-based. Thus, the civil law and common

3 5 1 . See Smith, supra note 38, at 548-49.
352. The prior difference in approach was once described as "a difference that goes
to

the root of fundamental conceptions." Cohn, supra note

1 0, at 399.
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law approaches to the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises
have converged both at the macro and the micro levels. Although the
"bifurcated" American approach suffers

from

some

conceptual

anomalies, the "concurrent" approach utilized by South Africa,
Scotland, and Louisiana is also unsatisfactory.

Recasting landlord

liability for the condition of the premises as a single, hybrid cause of
action addresses both conceptual and practical incongruities rife within
the American common law as well as within these mixed jurisdictions.
Providentially, the framework for dealing with the special nature
of landlord liability for defective premises is largely already in place.
Each jurisdiction studied here except Louisiana has implemented a
special statutory scheme to govern aspects of residential tenancy. The
United States' Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and
related landlord-tenant statutes, Scotland's Housing Act, and South
Africa's Rental Housing Act could each be amended with relative ease
to alter the existing scheme for landlord liability for defective
premises.

Even in Louisiana, where a special statutory regime for

rental housing does not yet exist, ad hoc statutory enactments dealing
with contorts are not entirely foreign.353 Each jurisdiction must utilize
its own framework to develop a single, unified cause of action
designed to address landlord liability for defective premises. Although
each jurisdiction will begin at a unique starting point, all should adapt
existing law with a view toward a collective end:

eliminating the

distinction between contract and tort, which has led to anomalous,
inefficient, and unjust effects in this area of the law.
Although the distinction between contract and tort remains
theoretically and academically sound, the formal categories of law
shaped by tradition and by accident tend to obscure the social
problems with which the law deals.354

Formalistic divisions between

contract and tort occasionally must give way to permit creative
solutions to specific social ills.

Now that residential landlords are

more stringently regulated by the state, the contract of residential lease
finds itself at the precarious boundary between contract and tort.
Recognizing the landlord's obligation for the condition of the premises
as contort is the first step toward designing the creative solutions

353. Indeed, Louisiana's Products Liability Act removed claims involving personal
injury from the duality of contract (sale) versus tort in the late 1 980s. See Louisiana Products
Liability Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51 -.60 (2010).
354. See Brainerd Currie, The Matenals of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL Eouc. 33 1 , 334
(195 1 ).
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needed to appropriately balance the rights of residential landlords and
their tenants.

